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THE SHIFTING SANDS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, FEDERAL
RAILROAD GRANTS, AND ECONOMIC HISTORY: HASH V
UNITED STATESAND THE THREAT TO RAIL-TRAIL
CONVERSIONS
By
DANAYA C. WRIGHT*
This Article is an analysis of a federal circuit case from 2005 that has
spawned some disturbing precedents in the area of federal
transportation and ralbanking policy Specifically, the National Trails
System Act (NTSA) provides a mechanism for preserving unused railroad
corridors for future reactivation while allowing interim recreational trail
and mixed utiity use along the corridor. Converting rail corridors to
recreational trails is a very popular process and communities across the
country are demanding more and more conversions, as people seek the
amenities of linear parks and green ways.
Hash v. United States, however, deals with the property rights
underlying the thousands of miles of iailroad corridors that were
granted directly to the railroads by the federal government out of
public lands. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the
government no longer had any interest in these lands, even though the
railroads only received easements. This ruling effectively ordered that
the application of the NTSA to federally granted corridors is a facial
taking requiring compensation in all cases. However, the United States
Supreme Court has never found that any federal law works a facial
taking, and the Court upheld the railbanking act as permissible under
Interstate Commerce. Yet, the effect of this case is to find a facial
taking fifteen years after the Supreme Court said there was not one.
The decision renders null a number of federal statutes enacted to
dispose of these corridors and generally throws a wrench into the
otherwise relatively stable jurisprudence of federal railroad property
law. And although at least one successor case is on appeal, it is critical
that this decision be revisited in a thorough manner. Even if successive
courts adopt the property determinations of the Hash decision, there
* Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I wish to thank Michael Wolf
and Christine Klein for their helpful comments and analysis as I worked through these ideas. I
also wish to thank Andrea Ferster at Rails-to-Trails Conservancy for her comments and ever-
sensible guidance, and the Levin College of Law for its generous research grants that have
allowed me the time to focus on this case.
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are a number of ancillary issues that are citical to railbanking, corridor
preservation, and interim trail use that need to be resolved before we
lose these corridors forever
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rarely does a single case, especially out of a circuit court, threaten to
undermine an entire area of well-established (and correct) case law
interpreting numerous federal statutes. But that is precisely the situation
arising in the context of the conversion of federally-granted railroad rights-
of-way (FGROW) to recreational trails under the railbanking statute.' In
2005, the Federal Circuit, in Hash v. United States,3 decided the question of
whether the federal government retained any underlying interest in FGROW
when it made subsequent land patents of the adjoining land. In holding that
the government's servient fee interest4 in FGROW passed to patentees at the
1 Federally-granted rights-of-way were donated to various railroads and states for
construction of railroad lines. These rights-of-way were between 60 and 200 feet wide and
originated in either individual acts of Congress to particular railroads, to states to pass through
to railroads, or via two general right-of-way acts that granted rights-of-way to any charter
railroad across the public lands if they filed a map of definite location with the Department of
the Interior. See discussion of FGROW infra Part II.
2 Railroads seeking to preserve their corridors for future reactivation while allowing
interim trail use may railbank their corridor pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). They must follow
the procedures established by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) regarding rail
abandonments and the use of rights-of-ways as trails. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1152.20-1152.37 (2007).
See also Danaya C. Wright, Rails-to-Trails: Conversion of Railroad Corridors to Recreational
Trails, in 11 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 78A-1 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2007).
3 403 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
4 As discussed below, FGROW have been held to be grants of fee simple absolute, fee
simple determinable, and easements; but the grant in this case was determined to be an
easement and that issue was not contested by the government. The interest the government
would have retained if an easement was granted to a railroad would be the servient fee and not
a reversionary interest. See discussion of shifting interpretations of FGROW kinfhi Part III.
HeinOnline  -- 38 Envtl. L. 712 2008
THE THREAT TO RAIL- TRAIL CONVERSIONS
time of original homestead patents, the court went against decades of
precedents finding that the federal interest in railroad land grants was
excluded from subsequent patents.5 More worrisome, however, is that later
courts have interpreted dicta in Hash to compel a finding that any
preservation of FGROW for rail-trail conversion constitutes a taking
requiring compensation.' This decision, in conjunction with a handful of
lower court rulings, threatens to seriously undermine this country's
commitment to railbanking (the preservation of unused rail corridors for
future reactivation)7 and its support of rail-trail conversions, and creates a
windfall for private landowners at the expense of the public lands. And this
is not just about hard cases making bad law;' these cases misuse history,
distort legal principles, and upset well-established precedents in a way that
profoundly undermines our commitment to the rule of law.
Since the 1830s, the federal government has granted to railroads a right-
of-way across public lands for the location of their roads. Between 1852 and
1862 this right-of-way was granted pursuant to a general statute giving
charter railroads a right-of-way 100-feet wide, plus timber, gravel, and the
right to build suitable drains.'" Between 1862 and 1871 the government
granted 100-foot or 200-foot rights-of-way to the transcontinental railroads
via individual acts of Congress, in addition to alternating sections of land on
either side of the roadway for sale to raise construction funds." This lavish
land grant policy, combined with grants to the states which were to be
transferred to the railroads, resulted in the transfer to private railroads of
over 130 million acres of public land.12 After 1871, dissatisfaction with the
railroads and their delays in bringing this public land to market led Congress
to discontinue the checkerboard grants, and to pass another general right-of-
way act in 1875 to grant to any railroad a 200-foot right-of-way through the
5 See discussion of homestead precedents and 43 U.S.C. § 912 precedents ignored in Hash
infra Parts VI, VIII.
6 See Hash v. United States, No. CV-99-324-S-MHW, 2007 WL 1309548, at *1, *4 (D. Idaho
Feb. 1, 2007); Blendu v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 543, 547-48 (Fed. Cl. 2007); Ellamae Phillips
Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 387, 392-96 (Fed. Cl. 2007), cert. for interlocutory appeal
granted, 2008 WL 586408 (Fed. Cir. Feb 7, 2008) (Misc. No. 867); Brown v. N. Hills Reg'l R.R.
Auth., 732 N.W.2d 732, 738-39 (S.D. 2007); Home on the Range v. AT&T Corp., 386 F.Supp.2d
999 (S.D. Ind. 2005); see also discussion on the impact of these cases infra Part X.
7 Railbanking is a process of preserving rail corridors from complete abandonment
established by the Surface Transportation Board pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). See discussion
infra Part IV and sources cited supra note 2.
8 GEORGE HAYES, CROGATES'S CASE: A DIALOGUE IN YE SHADES ON SPECIAL PLEADING REFORM
(1854), reprinted in 9 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 423 (3d ed. 1944).
See also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (presenting Justice Holmes's first
dissenting opinion).
9 See inzfra note 35 and accompanying text.
10 Act of Aug. 4, 1852, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 28.
11 See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 341-86 (1968); THOMAS E.
ROOT, RAILROAD LAND GRANTS: FROM CANALS TO TRANSCONTINENTALS 21-25 (1987); JAMES W.
ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAw 51-59 (2001).
12 See GATES, supra note 11, at 384-85. Direct grants to the railroads constituted almost 95
million acres and grants to the states, to pass on to the railroads, constituted another 37 million
acres. Id.
20081
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public lands but no additional lands for sale (1875 Act). 13 The 1875 Act has
remained unchanged as 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-39, even though there are no
modem railroads engaged in new construction. 14
In 1916, railroad mileage in this country reached its peak of 270,000
miles, only to dwindle to half that amount by the present day.15 Competition
from trucking and airlines, in addition to consolidations and mergers, has
caused the majority of these railroad miles to disappear, primarily to the
adjacent landowner who absorbs the abandoned corridor land under a
variety of statutory and common law mechanisms. 6 Pursuant to a 1922
statute, the federal interest in abandoned FGROWs would pass to either a
municipality, be transferred for a public highway, or pass to adjacent
landowners. 7 In 1983, however, a growing environmental and alternative
transportation movement successfully urged passage of amendments to the
National Trails System Act (NTSA)' s to save these railroad corridors for
future reactivation and interim trail use.'9 If the proper federal process is
followed, a railroad can "railbank" its corridor for future use while
transferring its ownership (and liabilities) to a trail sponsor for linear trail
and greenway use.2" In 1988 Congress realized that its policy of disposing of
abandoned FGROW was inconsistent with the railbanking policy, and thus it
enacted further amendments to the NTSA providing that the federal interest
in FGROW would be retained and railbanked, rather than given away to
adjoining landowners. 21 These 1988 amendments harmonized the
government's dual policies of promoting railroad corridor preservation and
recreational trail use.2
2
13 General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, ch. 152, §§ 1-6, 18 Stat. 482 (1875) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (2000)).
14 Id.
15 Andrea C. Ferster, Rals-to-Trails Conversions: A Review ofLegal ISSues, PLAN. & ENVTL.
L., Sept. 2006, at 3-4 (stating that between 1980 and 1990 anywhere from 4,000 to 8,000 miles
were lost each year).
16 Some states have statutory or common law rules that adjacent landowners will own up to
the centerline of abandoned railroad corridors even if their own deeds do not include the corridor
land. See Wright, supra note 2, at 78A-64. Other landowners simply absorb the land and then allege
adverse possession if the railroad challenges their possessory rights. Other states, however, more
strictly protect the railroad's rights from incursions by adjacent landowners, denying the latter
standing to question the title of the railroad unless they have deeds with actual descriptions of the
corridor land. See, e.g., Keife v. Logan, 75 P.3d 357, 360 (Nev. 2003); Brown v. Washington, 924 P.2d
908 (Wash. 1996); Smith v. Malone, 742 N.E.2d 785 (Il. App. Ct. 2000).
17 Act of Mar. 8, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-163, 42 Stat. 414 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000)).
18 National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2000)).
19 See National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11, 97 Stat. 42, 48
(1983) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000)).
20 Id
21 National Trails Systems Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-470, 102 Stat. 2281,
2281 (1988) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §1248(c) (2000)).
22 The United States Supreme Court in Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission
discussed at length the dual purposes of the railbanking statute (interim trail use and corridor
preservation) when affirming its constitutionality. 494 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1990). And, as Judge
Feinberg said in the Second Circuit decision in Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
"[railbanking] seems a remarkably efficient and sensible way to achieve both goals." 853 F.2d
[Vol. 38:711
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Courts have been remarkably inconsistent in their treatment of
FGROW, holding that some grants conveyed fee simple absolute to the
railroads with no retained interest by the federal government, that others
conveyed fee simple determinable with an implied possibility of reverter
upon abandonment, and that others conveyed an easement.3 Both the
defeasible fee and easements entail a retained interest in the government
which would be subject to disposal only upon the railroad's abandonment.
In 1922, Congress adopted 43 U.S.C. § 91224 to dispose of its retained
interest in FGROW held as defeasible fee, but it was unclear whether it
would also apply to FGROW held as easements, especially since the courts
did not adopt the easement interpretation until twenty years after
section 912 was passed.25 Despite the uncertainty in the terminology of the
abandonment statute, however, courts have consistently applied it to all
retained interests, whether possibilities of reverter or servient fee
interests, on the assumption that whatever interests the government
retained in these railroad grants should be disposed of consistently with
Congress's clear mandate.2" At no time, however, did Congress think that
its retained interest in FGROW had transferred to homestead patentees,
either before or after 1922, and was therefore not available for disposal
under section 912.27
The challenge made on behalf of successors to homestead patentees 28
is based on the argument that the government's interest in FGROW passed
to patentees at the time of their original patent.29 Under this theory, the
only parties with interests in FGROW are the railroads and the adjacent
landowners, and the government has no property sticks left in the public
lands it has given away. Thus, the 1922 abandonment act and the 1988
NTSA amendments disposing of the federal interest in FGROW were a
waste of Congress's time because there is no federal interest in FGROW
where the adjoining land has been patented to a private individual.
Congress cannot subsequently pass an act to dispose of or retain interests
145, 150. (2d Cir. 1988). See also Danaya C. Wright & Scott Andrew Bowman, Charitable
Deductions for Ral-T ail Conversions: Reconciling the Partial Interest Rule and the National
Trait System Act 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 581, 585-87 (2008) (discussing the dual
purposes of the railbanking statute).
23 See Wright, supra note 2, at 78A-66 to 78A-81 (discussing FGROW cases).
24 Act of Mar. 8, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-163, 42 Stat. 414 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000)).
25 See discussion infra Part Ill.
26 See Wright, supra note 2, at 78A-94.
27 Id. at 78A-119.
28 I use the term patentee and homesteader interchangeably, even though some adjacent
landowners along some FGROW acquired their land through processes other than the 1862
Homestead Act. See, e.g. GATES, supra note 11, at 387-434 (discussing the different laws that
allowed for purchase or free grants of land to settlers). The Hash court did not distinguish
between adjacent landowners who acquired their land directly from the railroad and would not
have an interest in the underlying fee of the corridor, though such land ownership would not
exist with 1875 Act FGROW because the latter did not include the checkerboard grants. See,
e.g., Bd. of Comn'rs of Weld County v. Anderson, 525 P.2d 478 (Colo. App. 1974).
29 See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12-15, Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (No. 03-1395), 2003 WL 25291551.
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in land that it no longer possesses, and if it does it is guilty of a taking
without just compensation. 30
When the federal circuit in Hash v. United States upheld the claims of
the homesteaders, it profoundly altered decades of precedents, including
United States Supreme Court precedents, holding that the federal
government had a retained interest in FGROW that could be disposed of or
retained pursuant to federal statute, principally 43 U.S.C. § 912.
Furthermore, because no federal interest was deemed to have passed to
anyone until at least one year after the railroad had abandoned its FGROW,
which must be determined only by act of Congress or decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction, Congress could amend its policies of disposal and
choose to retain the federal interests in order to preserve railroad corridors
for future rail or other transportation purposes. The Hash decision, however,
found that the federal property interest was transferred out of federal
ownership at the time homestead patents were issued and that later statutes
dealing with those interests have no effect.
31
Since 2005 at least five other courts have followed the Hash decision on
issues they believed followed from the finding that the government has no
retained interest in FGROW,32 even though these ancillary issues were not
briefed nor argued before the court. They felt the Hash court had mandated
certain findings in an offhand remark.' For many reasons, this decision is
problematic, and this Article explains why. After first giving a history of
federal/railroad land relations (Part II), federal court interpretations of
FGROW interests (Part III), and the mechanics of abandonment, railbanking,
and takings (Part IV), I briefly summarize the Hash case and its resolution
(Part V). I then analyze the case from a number of different perspectives: the
rights of homesteaders under federal patents (Part VI), Congress's statutory
responses to forfeited and abandoned FGROW (Part VII), the applicability of
section 912 to all types of FGROW (Part VIII), and the scope of FGROW held
as easements (Part IX). I then give a brief examination of the numerous
judges who have felt compelled to follow Hash, even though they have not
done so without criticism (Part X) and conclude by offering one way to limit
the effects of this ill-reasoned decision in order to protect important federal
transportation interests (Part XI). I only hope that a more scholarly and
thoughtful look at this issue may help limit the damage of the Hash case
and/or justify its reversal.
30 Id at 28-39.
31 Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d at 1317-18.
32 Hash v. United States, No. CV-99-324-S-MHW, 2007 WL 1309548, at *5-6 (D. Idaho Feb. 1,
2007); Blendu v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 543, 545-49 (Fed. Cl. 2007); Ellamae Phillips Co. v.
United States, 77 Fed. CI. 387, 393-95 (Fed. C1. 2007), cert for interlocutory appeal granted,
2008 WL 586408 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 7, 2008) (Misc. No. 867); Brown v. N. Hills Reg'l R.R. Auth., 732
N.W.2d 732, 736-40 (S.D. 2007); Home on the Range v. AT&T Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1016-24
(S.D. Ind. 2005).
33 See, e.g., Blendu v. United States, 75 Fed. C1. at 546.
[Vol. 38:711
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II. FEDERAL RAILROAD LAND-GRANT POLICIES
Throughout the nineteenth century, the federal government actively
facilitated railroad construction.' In 1834, Congress began granting to
individual railroads rights-of-way through public lands for a width of 60-100
feet for road construction to aid the fledgling railroads all along the eastern
seaboard and into the southern territories.35 By the 1850s, the railroads had
emerged as the most efficient investment in transportation infrastructure,
beating out canals and plank roads, as they were far more economical to
build and easier to control and maintain.36 As demands by railroads for free
land increased, Congress passed a general right-of-way act in 1852 (1852
Act) giving to any charter railroad a 100-foot right-of-way across the public
lands, plus the right to use earth, stone, and timber on adjacent public land
in railroad construction, and to take additional land for depots and water
tanksY The 1852 Act avoided the necessity of having to pass individual acts
each time a railroad sought access across federally-owned public lands.
But with the California gold rush and frantic development in the
Midwestern states throughout the 1850s, people were pouring into new
territories west of the Mississippi River that had little infrastructure, no
railroads, and no revenues to fund construction. Beginning in 1850, the
federal government became involved in a clever scheme by which alternate
sections of land on each side of a right-of-way would be granted to the states
to pass to the railroads,3 9 who would, in turn, sell this excess land to raise
34 See ELY, supra note 11, at 19-30, 32-40. See also ROOT, supra note 11, at 25-35; GATES,
supra note 11, at 341-42.
35 The first federal railroad grant was in 1834. Resolution of June 25, 1834, ch. 3, 4 Stat. 744.
For further discussion of federal railroad grants, see GATES, supra note 11, at 357. Other early
grants included, for example, Act of Jan. 31, 1837, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 144; Act of June 28, 1838, ch. 150,
5 Stat. 253; Act of Sept. 20, 1850, ch. 61, 9 Stat. 466. These grants generally conveyed a right-of-
way across the public lands along a broadly defined route. For example, one early grant
authorized "certain rail-road companies to construct railroads through the public lands in the
Territory of Florida." Act of Jan. 31, 1837, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 144. These grants also included the right
to take timber, gravel, and water along the routes, as well as the rights to alter the drainage and
build embankments. Id.
36 See, e.g., DAVID AMOTr, ERIC GOLLANER & DAVID AKERS, A HISTORY OF DELAWARE ROADS
AND A GUIDE TO RESEARCHING THEM 13 (2006), available athttp://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/
bitstream/19716/2673/1/History%20of620Delaware%20roads%20and%20guide%20fori20research.
pdf ("Steam driven locomotives rapidly eclipsed road and water transportation for the efficient
movement of passengers and goods across long distances.").
37 Act of Aug. 4, 1852, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 28 (including the right to take earth, stone, and timber
alongside the corridor to aid in road construction).
38 See, e.g, JAMES R. RASBAND, QUESTIONING THE RULE OF CAPTURE METAPHOR FOR NINETEEN
CENTURY PUBLIC LAND LAW: A LOOK AT R.S. 2477,35 ENVTL. L. 1005, 1016-17 (2005) ("The right-of-
way alone proved insufficient to stimulate entrepreneurs to undertake the great task of
extending railroads across the antion.")
39 This pass-through policy was necessitated by state constitutions that prevented states
from building the railroad itself; thus, federal grants had to be passed from the states to the
railroads. See GATES, supra note 11, at 359 (describing Illinois Constitution). Additionally, there
was considerable opposition to the donation of public lands to private entities for internal
improvement. See id. at 352 (describing the Jackson Administration's reduction in federal aid
for internal improvements).
2008]
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money to aid in the construction of the road.40 By 1858, federal land grants
to the states to pass to the railroads totaled almost 28,000,000 acres for over
8,600 miles of road in Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas,
Alabama, and Florida.4 Even still, the policies were somewhat haphazard,
and the legality of and the commitment to these grants in aid were subject to
political flux until the early 1860s.42
When the disjointed railroad system throughout the South failed to
meet the needs of both sides during the Civil War, and with the absence of
southern lawmakers in Congress, the federal government finally stepped in
to aid directly the construction of the transcontinental railroads, which
could not have been funded through the traditional methods of private,
capital investment or statewide charters that had been used in building the
eastern and southern railways.4 3 The first transcontinental railroad, the
40 These "grants in aid" involved transferring to the entity constructing the railroad fee
simple title to alternate sections of land between 1 and 15 miles on each side, which would be
removed from the public registry upon mapping by the entity, and then be sold to raise money
for construction. See GATES, supranote 11, at 356; Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668,
672-73 (1979). Legislators assumed that the value of the land retained by the government would
at least double, thus eliminating any loss of revenue to the treasury but facilitating the
development of public infrastructure that states and private entities could not undertake
themselves. Thus, Congress reasoned that it could give away half of the land on either side of
the proposed railroad, that the value of the land would increase simply because of the promise
of imminent railroad construction, that the railroad could sell the land at the new value to fund
construction, and that the federal government would retain half the land now worth more than
twice its value, thus preserving the value of its federal land holdings. It was a win-win situation
for everyone. See Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 672-73; LLOYD J. MERCER, RAILROADS AND LAND
GRANT POuCY: A STUDY IN INTERVENTION 3-4 (1982). The technique had been used successfully
for construction of canals and highways in the 1830s and 1840s, and pressure inevitably arose to
use the same technique for construction of railroads. See GATES, supra note 11, at 354-56.
41 GATES, supranote 11, at 361-62.
42 Although few questioned Congress's power to authorize construction of these railroads
directly, many criticized this plan for subsidizing private construction of national infrastructure,
asserting the federal government lacked the power to turn federal lands over to private
ownership for internal improvements. Presidential administrations responded to these critics
differently, and Andrew Jackson's administration drastically curtailed the liberal policies of
John Quincy Adams's administration. See GATES, supra note 11, at 352. When the federal
government retreated, many developing states stepped up to the plate to make their own state
land grants, pass state right-of-way acts, and grant the railroads broad eminent domain powers.
See id. at 356-59. There were obvious questions about the appropriateness of eminent domain
when private land was being turned over to private ownership, even for an arguably public use.
See id. at 356-65 (describing early history of land grants for railroads); see also Robert W.
Swenson, Railroad Land Grants: A Chapter in Public Land Law, 5 UTAH L. REV. 456, 457 (1956-
1957) (describing opposition to federal subsidies for railroads based on "feeling that such grants
for internal improvements were unconstitutional").
43 Parochial attitudes had made interconnection between railroads 'across state lines very
difficult. Some states required railroads in their boundaries to use a different gauge to prevent
interconnection, thus requiring that freight passing through the state would have to be unloaded
and reloaded on its own local railroads. See ELY, supra note 11, at 43-44. Ironically, the first
transcontinental land grant was made possible only by the cession of the southern congressmen
who had advocated for a southern route to the Pacific Ocean. Thus, in the midst of the war,
Congress finally mustered the support to create a more northerly line from Nebraska to the
Nevada border, where it would meet up with the Central Pacific Railroad that was already
chartered under California law. See id. at 51-53; see aso STEPHEN AMBROSE, NOTHING LIKE IT IN
[Vol. 38:711
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Union Pacific, would link Omaha, Nebraska, with San Francisco, California,
traversing states and territories that had inadequate legal and economic
resources to attract a private railroad.' This grant was followed in 1864 by
the Northern Pacific grant to link Lake Superior with Puget Sound;45 in 1866
by the Southern Pacific grant to link Springfield, Missouri, with southern
California;4 and in 1871 by the Texas Pacific grant to link El Paso, Texas,
with San Diego, California. 47 These transcontinental grants all involved
generous donations of land to be sold to aid in construction, along with 200-
to 400-foot rights-of-way across federal lands, rights to place telegraph lines,
and access to timber, gravel, water, and other resources a distance of ten,
twenty, or even forty miles from the corridor.48
Through the checkerboard grants-in-aid and pass-throughs from the
states, Congress gave the railroads over 130 million acres of public lands on
which to construct their roads or to sell to fund the construction, most of
which was granted between 1862 and. 1867.4 ' The federal land that was
promised to the railroads, however, could not be acquired and converted
into cash until the road had been surveyed and built.5" If portions of the road
were not built, the adjacent sections of land were forfeited. 1 To this day, a
THE WORLD: THE MEN WHO BUILT THE TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD 1863-1869 63-82 (2000)
(describing historical events leading to congressional authorization of the Central Pacific
railroad).
44 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, 493-94, amended by Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 216,
13 Stat. 356. The statute authorized a capitalization of $100 million from stock subscriptions,
authorized loans of $16,000 per mile in 30-year government bonds for construction, and granted
the railroad a 400-foot right-of-way through the public lands. Id. at 490-92. It also granted 10
odd-numbered sections of land for each mile of road constructed, amounting to a checkerboard
belt of land extending 5, 10, or 20 miles wide on both sides of the road. Id. at 492. This act
created the Union Pacific Railroad, which would begin building eastward out of San Francisco,
and the Central Pacific Railroad, which would build westward out of Omaha, meeting
somewhere in the middle. Id. at 493.
45 Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365, amended by Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 378,
378-79 (1870).
46 Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292. The Southern Pacific grant was actually made to
the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad, which went bankrupt in 1875, after which a variety of other
railroads, including the Atcheson, Topeka, the St. Louis, and The Atlantic & Pacific Railroad
Company Inc., picked up construction. See ROOT, supra note 11, at 45-50 (describing history of
the southern grants).
47 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 122, 16 Stat. 573, 578.
48 For instance, the Union Pacific grant included a 400-foot right of way. Act of July 2, 1862,
ch. 120, § 2, 12 Stat. 489, 491.
49 The federal government granted some land directly to the railroads, and granted some
land to the states for sale to aid the construction. See GATES, supra note 11, at 384-85. Roughly
37,000,000 acres of land were given to states to aid the railroads, and 94,000,000 acres were
given directly to the railroads. See FRANK WILNER, RAILROAD LAND GRANTS: PAID IN FULL, U.S.
OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 8,24-25 (1984).
50 A complex system existed to give the railroads indemnity lands or lieu lands if land
within their primary grant had been previously transferred to homesteaders or was a section set
aside for schools, thus leading to railroad land holdings 40 and 80 miles away from the actual
roadbed. ROOT, supm note 11, at.59-61.
51 Numerous statutes and cases in the last half of the 19th and early half of the 20th
centuries attempted to resolve questions of forfeitures and indemnity lands. See, eg, Act of
Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 376, 24 Stat. 556; Act of Sept. 29, 1890, ch. 1040, 26 Stat. 496 (codified at 43
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significant portion of the checkerboard land is still retained by the
railroads. 2 For purposes of rail-trail conversions, however, the only lands
that raise important legal issues are the 100-, 200-, or 400-foot "rights-of-way"
across the public lands that were granted for the actual road construction,
although shifting attitudes toward the railroads that were heavily influenced
by the land grants were critical in later judicial decisions resolving disputes
over the corridor land.'
Even before the lavish land grants had begun, however, complaints
against the granting of public lands to private entities spurred opposition to
the checkerboard grants.' By the late 1860s labor strikes, the complaints of
western settlers that railroad land was not being brought to market quickly
enough, the Granger movement, and economic depressions led the charge
against all railroad privileges, including the privilege of setting their own rates
and mapping routes.55 Following growing dissatisfaction with the liberal land
grants in the early 1870s, Congress stopped all land grants-in-aid of railroad
construction, did not directly charter a federal railroad after the 1871 Texas
Pacific Railroad, and passed a law in 1875 granting to all railroads a 200-foot
right-of-way across all public lands but no other assistance. 56 The next
seventy-five years would be spent settling claims with the railroads over
forfeitures and compliance with the terms of their grants.5
The decade of the 1880s saw the greatest construction of railroad
mileage, yet competition drove many of the decisions made by railroad
companies and politicians. Ultimately, competition became so destructive as
to spur the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887
to regulate railroad rates and services' and the Sherman Antitrust Act of
U.S.C. §§ 904-07). See also the forest lieu lands "last chance" statutes: Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2,
30 Stat. 11; Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1495, 33 Stat. 1264; Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 404, 42 Stat.
1017; Act of Apr. 28, 1930, ch. 219, § 6, 46 Stat. 256; Act of July 7, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-596, 74
Stat. 334; Act of July 2, 1993, Pub. L. No. 10348, 107 Stat. 234. See also the forfeiture acts on
which the Hash case relies: Act of June 26, 1906, ch. 3550, 34 Stat. 482; Act of Feb. 25, 1909, ch.
191, 35 Stat 647. For a discussion of the lieu land statutes, see Strickland v. United States, 199
F.3d 1310, 1311-13 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For efforts to get the railroads to release claims to public
lands in exchange for the right to collect increased rates, see Transportation Act of 1940, ch.
722, 54 Stat. 898, 954 (1940).
52 U.S. Dep't of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, The Checkerboard, http'/lwww.blim.gov/
wy/stlen/programs/specialareas/ContinentalDivide/ckrbrd.htnl (last visited July 20, 2008).
53 See discussion infra Part I.
54 See GATES, supra note 11, at 380.
55 See id. Some railroads would take freight along a circuitous route to avoid
interconnection problems. ELY, supra note 11, at 13-16.
56 General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482 (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (2000)).
57 ELY, supra note 11, at 60. For instance, some railroads ignored provisions in their grants
that they were to sell only 20-acre parcels to homesteaders, especially when the land was most
appropriate for timbering and not agriculture. However, after decades of noncompliance, the
government was hard-pressed to justify enforcement against one railroad and not another. Id
58 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). The Act explicitly
preempted all local regulation of rates and services and established the ICC to oversee the
national rail transportation system. Id.
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1890"9 to control price gouging, monopolies, and other anti-competitive
behavior. The Granger movement of the late 1870s and 1880s also played a
key role in reining in the great railroad giants by bringing tremendous
political pressure to curtail the single largest form of corporate welfare to
date.' Ironically, congressional lawmakers from the grain-belt states of
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Wisconsin, who had
benefited greatly from federal land grants to aid the railroads in the 1850s
and early 1860s, were some of the most outspoken opponents of the
transcontinental grants.6
Even with federal regulation of minimum rates after 1887, however,
railroads 'continued to engage in destructive competition and used
consolidations and bankruptcies to further business, rather than national
transportation, needs. The Hepburn Act of 190662 allowed the ICC to set
maximum and minimum railroad rates. I Even so, the ICC could not
effectively regulate the railroads. In the second decade of the 1900s, railroad
consolidation hit a new high. World War I (WWI) and the nationalization of
the railroads placed a tremendous burden on a national rail system that was
overbuilt in some areas and underbuilt in others.' With competition from
trucking,61 the mass production of the WWI years made possible by large-
scale electricity generation, and the move toward international economies,
the ICC simply could not effectively regulate the many railroad
consolidations, location, and abandonments. With the end of nationalization,
a comprehensive Transportation Act 66 was passed in 1920 (1920 Act) to deal
with the fact that railroads were abandoning overbuilt lines at an alarming
rate and the questions about what to do with railroad lands upon
abandonment had begun to crowd the courts.
6 7
In an important element of the 1920 Act, Congress assigned the ICC
jurisdiction over abandonments of rail lines as well as over rates and
services.6 With the 1920 Act, Congress gave the ICC direct control over the
59 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-42000)).
60 See GATES, supra note 11, at 380.
61 Id
62 Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
63 GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877-1916 131 (1965).
64 ELY, supra note 11, at 241-42.
65 See KOLKO, supra note 63, at 230 ("The automobile and trucking industries, and not
shippers or radical state legislatures, were to nullify the benefits to the railroads of the
Transportation Act. Nothing could save the railroads from the impact of the revolution in
American transportation that was beginning to roll off the assembly lines of Detroit.").
66 Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
67 See id. at 477-78 (requiring railroad companies to first obtain from the ICC "a certificate
that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment").
68 Id. at 476-77.. If a railroad satisfactorily shows that the present or future public
convenience and necessity require or permit the abandonment or discontinuance of a rail line, it
has one year during which to "consummate" that abandonment by notifying the agency (first the
ICC, now the STB) that it has fully abandoned the line. ICC Termination Act of 1995, 49 U.S.C.
§ 10903(d) (2000); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(e)(2) (2007). If it fails to notify the STB within one year,
the certificate of abandonment or discontinuance expires and the line remains on the STB's
active carrier list. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(e)(2) (2007).
20081
HeinOnline  -- 38 Envtl. L. 721 2008
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
decision of whether or not a railroad was required to operate or was allowed
to abandon a line, and the authority to determine the responsibilities the
railroad had if it were granted permission to abandon it. 69 The criteria for
granting approval to abandon a line are whether the public convenience and
necessity permitted discontinuation of services.7" Since 1920, a finding that
public convenience and necessity permit abandonment has required
consideration of "serious adverse impact[s] on rural and community
development" 71 Notably, however, the imposition of federal jurisdiction
over railroad abandonments, for railroads that had often acquired property
rights under state law prior to 1920, meant that state-law property rights
would be held in limbo during the period of federal control, and that not
until abandonment occurred and the federal jurisdiction was lifted would
railroad property rights again be determined under state law.7 2
Further competition from trucldng. and airlines, and a shift in
government subsidies from the railroads to automakers and interstate
highways, resulted in another burst of railroad abandonments in the 1970s
and early 1980s.73 And, despite legislation in 1974 and 1976 with such
69 City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1027-31 (9th Cir. 1998) (preempting state
and local land use and environmental regulations); Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 76
(Fed. Cl. 1992) (noting that the Transportation Act of 1920 established ICC's approval over
abandonment and operation of railroad lines). Although the state-based property rights of the
railroads were not directly affected by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the regulatory
control over services resulted in federal preemption of nearly all railroad matters. Thus, if a
railroad had been constructed before 1887 pursuant to a state charter and was operating its line
pursuant to the rights in place at the time the corridor was acquired, after 1887 federal control
over services resulted in the holding in abeyance of all state property rights during the period of
federal control. If a line was ultimately abandoned, and federal jurisdiction removed, then state
laws governing the disposition of land and other property would become effective. And
although the federal government never attempted to directly regulate the property rights of the
railroads ids-,-vis adjoining landowners or state and local governments, the regulation of
services could severely reduce the property rights that various parties thought existed under
state law. See Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. at 73-75, 90 (providing extensive discussion
of the interplay of ICC jurisdiction and state property rights).
70 ICC Termination Act of 1995, 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d) (2000).
71 Id.
72 In Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, the United Sates Supreme Court
rejected the view that the imposition of federal jurisdiction that potentially alters state-law
property rights constituted a taking. 494 U.S. 1, 4-5, 8-9 (1990). However, there is great
disagreement as to the effect of federal abandonment jurisdiction on the property rights of
railroads and adjacent landowners. With regard to federally-granted property rights, however,
the imposition of federal jurisdiction over abandonment has less effect. See, e.g., Preseault v.
United States, 27 Fed. Cl. at 71, 77, 79-80 (discussing the interplay of federal jurisdiction with
state property laws, and demonstrating one dispute as to the effect of federal abandonment on
property rights). Assuming the property laws are creatures of federal law, the interplay will be
necessarily different, though no cases have addressed that issue. See Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979) (stating that federally-created property rights are still
protected by the takings clause).
73 See Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. at 78 (discussing congressional recognition that
increased railroad abandonments during the 1970s constituted a "significant problem"); see also
Ferster, supra note 15, at 4 (stating that between 1980 and 1990 anywhere from 4,000 to 8,000
miles were lost each year); ASS'N OF AM. R.R.s, RAILROAD FACTS 5 (1992) (showing a 27 percent
decrease in the miles of track from 1981 to 1991).
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optimistic names as the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
that created the Consolidated Rail Corporation (CONRAIL) and reorganized
the rail system,7 4 the pressure for increased ability to abandon uneconomic
rail lines to boost rail profitability persisted.75 Indeed, the Staggers Rail Act
of 198076 lifted many restrictions on railroad abandonment to allow the
beleaguered industry to shed unprofitable lines with relatively little concern
for public transportation or utility needs. 77 But rails-to-trails, or the
conversion of abandoned railroad corridors to recreational trails, filled a
much-needed double role. It preserved rail corridors intact for possible
future transportation needs, and it provided valuable greenspace for cities
that had grown too quickly to adequately preserve open space.78
One of the most difficult issues involved in rail-trail conversions
pertains to the property rights granted to the railroad, and for FGROW the
rights retained by the federal government. 79 Despite the common view that
property rights and property law are relatively unchanging, there has been a
tremendous amount of inconsistency in congressional and judicial attitudes
toward the railroads and their property rights. 0 The U.S. government was an
active partner in railroad development from the earliest days. Its most
consistent policy was to grant rights-of-way over public lands for location of
the roads, just as it did for canals and highways. Notably, federal grants after
1832, including transcontinental grants from 1862-1871, and both the 1852
and 1875 right-of-way acts, repeatedly use the term "right-of-way" to
describe the interest being conveyed to the railroads for their corridors.8 "
74 Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31
(1976) (repealed 1994); Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, -Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985
(1974) (repealed 1976); see also Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. at 76 (discussing a brief
history of these acts and their purposes).
75 U.S. Dep't of Transp. Staff, Questions on Likely Effects of Reform, in RAILROAD
REVITALIZATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 86-91 (Paul MacAvoy & John Snow eds., 1977).
76 Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (2000)).
77 See Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. at 79 (discussing how the 1980 amendments
made it easier to abandon rail lines, particularly section 402(b) of the Act, which directed the
Commission to permit abandonment if it received no protest within 30 days after the filing of an
application for abandonment).
78 See id. at 80.
79 The retained interest when a fee simple determinable is granted is a reversion, which is a
contingent future interest in the right to possession. The retained interest underlying an
easement is, technically, fee ownership, which is a vested possessory right. See, e.g., Wright,
supra note 2, at 78A-39 to -47, 78A-120 (explaining the differences between fee interests and
easement interests in the context of railroad corridor rights). See also A-E. Korpela, Annotation,
Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement 6 A.L.R.3d 973, 1024-26 (1966)
(reviewing courts' construction of deeds as conferring easements and not fee simple grants). Of
course, the railroad easement is exclusive, so the fee ownership is nonpossessory, which makes
it look an awful lot like a reverter, but under standard terminology it is not a future interest that
would be subject to destruction under statutory and common-law marketable title acts. Danaya
C. Wright, Eminent Domain, Exactions and Railbanking: Can Recreational Trails Survive the
Court's Fifh Amendment Takings Jurisprudence?, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 399, 461-62 (2001).
80 Wright, supra note 2, at 78A-43 to -47, 78A-120.
81 See, e.g, Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 49, 5 Stat. 196; Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 116, 9 Stat. 771;
Act of Sept. 20, 1850, ch. 61, 9 Stat. 466; Act of June 10, 1852, ch. 45, 10 Stat. 8; Act of Aug. 4,
1852, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 28; Act of Feb. 9, 1853, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 155; Act of June 29, 1854, ch. 72, 10
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Yet, changing Supreme Court interpretations of the interest that passed to
the railroads created profound rifts in the legal logic and basis of the federal
railroad land grant policies, and those rifts have provided the space for the
Hash case and its progeny to erode important federal transportation policies.
II. THE SHIFTING SANDS OF FGROW PROPERTY RIGHTS
In 1880, the Supreme Court in St. Joseph & Denver City Railroad Co. v.
Baldwin,82 interpreted the right-of-way granted pursuant to the federal 1866
Kansas grant to aid the Northern Kansas Railroad and Telegraph' as
creating a fee simple absolute. In 1894, the Court followed the Baldwin
holding when interpreting the right-of-way interests conveyed under an 1866
Union Pacific grant in Missour, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Roberts,' and
followed up with New Mexico v. US. Trust Co.8" regarding the Atlantic &
Pacific grant of 1866.8 This practice of defining "right-of-way" as a fee
Stat. 302; Act of June 3, 1856, ch. 91, 11 Stat. 18; Act of June 3, 1856, ch. 92, 11 Stat. 20; Act of
Mar. 3, 1857, ch. 99, 11 Stat. 195; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch.
98, 12 Stat. 772; Act of May 5, 1864, ch. 80, 13 Stat. 66; Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356;
Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365; Act of July 4, 1866, ch. 165, 14 Stat. 83; Act of July 4,
1866, ch. 168, 14 Stat. 87; Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 212, 14 Stat. 210; Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 241,
14 Stat. 236; Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242, 14 Stat. 239; Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 270, 14 Stat. 289;
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 189, 14 Stat. 548; Act of May 4, 1870, ch. 69, 16 Stat. 94; Act of Mar. 3,
1871, ch. 122, 16 Stat. 573i General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482
(1875) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (2000)).
82 103 U.S. 426 (1880). The Court overturned a Nebraska Supreme Court decision holding a
homesteader whose patent did not include mention of the railroad right-of-way was not subject
to the railroad taking the land. See St. Joseph & Denver R.R. Co. v. Baldwin, 7 Neb. 247 (Neb.
1878). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that once the right of way was granted
to the railroad, even if the company had not laid out its line exactly, that land was removed and
could not be granted to homesteaders. St. Joseph & Denver City R.R. Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. at
430-31.
But the grant of the right of way by the sixth section contains no reservations or
exceptions. It is a present absolute grant, subject to no conditions except those
necessarily implied, such as that the road shall be constructed and used for the purposes
designed. Nor is there anything in the policy of the government with respect to the public
lands which would call for any qualification of the terms.
... Had a similar qualification upon the absolute grant of the right of way been
intended, it can hardly be doubted that it would have been expressed. The fact that none
is expressed is conclusive that none exists. We see no reason, therefore, for not giving to
the words of present grant with respect to the right of way the same construction which
we should be compelled to give, according to our repeated decisions, to the grant of
lands had no limitation been expressed. We are of opinion, therefore, that all persons
acquiring any portion of the public lands, after the passage of the act in question, took
the same subject to the right of way conferred by it for the proposed road.
Id. at 429-430.
83 Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 212, 14 Stat. 210.
84 152 U.S. 114, 117 (1894) (concerning a grant under the Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 270, 14
Stat. 289, and interpreting it as "absolute in terms, covering both the fee and possession").
85 172 U.S. 171 (1898).
86 Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292.
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simple absolute continued in 1926 in Missourj Kansas & Texas Railway v.
Oklahoma.87 The Tenth Circuit followed suit in 1981 and 2001 with regard to
the Union Pacific Railroad in Missour4 Kansas & Texas Railway v. Early,'
and Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Atoka.9 These cases all involved
federal grants pursuant to the 1862 and 1866 transcontinental acts, and
provided guidance for lower court interpretations of the federal right-of-way
interests conveyed pursuant to earlier and later grants."
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, faced with increasing
numbers of abandonments and forfeitures and incursions by settlers on
railroad lands, the Supreme Court reconsidered the parameters of the
property right in situations involving abandonment of the rail corridor after
the road was constructed.9' The Court in 1903 held, in Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. Townsend,92 that the interest granted to the railroad under
the 1864 Northern Pacific Act93 conveyed only a qualified or defeasible fee.
The discussion in Townsend was narrowly focused on whether Congress
could have intended that if the railroad failed, the railroad could sell the land
outright for any nonpublic purpose. 94 Relying on the public character of the
grant, the Court held the right-of-way contained an implied condition of
reverter.95 The Court subsequently held that a right-of-way granted under the
87 271 U.S. 303, 304, 309 (1926).
88 641 F.2d 856, 858-60 (10th Cir. 1981) ("The Act of July 26, 1866, when viewed in the light
of the times, clearly expresses the intent of Congress to grant to the railway a fee interest....").
89 6 Fed. App'x, 725, 733 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e hold the July 25[, 1866] Act conveyed to
Union Pacific a fee absolute title in its right-of-way with no right of reversion....").
90 See, e.g., Barnes v. S. Pac. Co., 16 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1926) (citing St. Joseph & Denver City
R.R. Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426 (1880)); City of Reno v. S. Pac. Co., 268 F. 751, 756-57 (9th Cir.
1920) (citing and quoting St. Joseph & Denver City R.R. Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426 (1880)).
91 Pursuant to the federal statutes granting the right-of-way, title would not vest in the
railroad until the line was built, though it would be removed from the federal land registry upon
filing a map of definite location. Forfeiture and abandonment functioned quite differently. Once
the line was surveyed the land was removed from the stock of land available for homesteaders.
If the line was then not actually built, the land would be returned to the lists of that available for
homesteaders. But once the, line was built, the land was vested in the railroad, and only upon
abandonment would the railroad's interests be defeated. Of course, the checkerboard lands
would remain in railroad ownership even if the railroad abandoned because the company had
completed the terms of the contract necessary to obtain that land. Only the corridor right-of-
way would be affected by abandonment, and only if the FGROW grant was deemed not to be a
fee simple absolute. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. City of Greeley, 189 F. 1, 3-5 (8th Cir.
1911); Nielson v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 184 F. 601, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1911); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend,
190 U.S. 267, 271-72 (1903).
92 190 U.S. 267 (1903). In effect the grant was of a limited fee, made on an implied condition
of reverter in the event that the company ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose for
which it was granted. See a1so N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ely, 197 U.S. 1 (1905); Clairmont v. United
States, 225 U.S. 551 (1912); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190 (1913).
93 Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365.
94 Townsend, 190 U.S. at 271 ("The substantial consideration inducing the grant was the
perpetual use of the land for the legitimate purposes of the railroad, just as though the land had
been conveyed in terms to have and to hold the same so long as it was used for the railroad
right of way. In effect the grant was of a limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter in
the event that the company ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose for which it was
granted.").
95 Id.
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1875 Act was also a "limited fee made on an implied condition of reverter,"
in the context of a possible abandonment in Rio Grande Western Railway
Co. v. Stringham.9 6 This reasoning was followed in many lower court cases
involving abandonments, in which the courts assumed that the limited fee
language of Townsend and Stingham was consistent with the fee simple
language of Baldwin.97 Because they were still interpreted to be fee interests,
Baldwin was not reversed.
In 1922, in direct response to the decisions in Townsend and Stringham,
Congress enacted 43 U.S.C. § 912 (1922 Act),9  which provided that railroad
abandonments of FGROW, if decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction or
act of Congress, 99 would result in the "right, title, interest, and estate of the
United States in said lands" being vested in the owner of the legal
subdivision from which the lands were taken.100 Two exceptions were
provided, however. First, if a public highway is legally established on that
right-of-way within one year of the abandonment, the federal interest would
transfer to the legal entity owning the highway. 1 ' Second, all right-of-way
96 239 U.S. 44, 47 (1915).
97 See, e.g, Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Mills, 222 F. 481 (8th Cir. 1915); Crandall v. Goss, 167 P.
1025 (Idaho 1917).
98 Act of Mar. 8, 1922, ch. 94, 42 Stat. 414 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000)). The
statute currently reads as follows:
Whenever public lands of the United States have been or may be granted to any railroad
company for use as a right of way for its railroad or as sites for railroad structures of any
kind, and use and occupancy of said lands for such purposes has ceased or shall
hereafter cease, whether by forfeiture or by abandonment by said railroad company
declared or decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction or by Act of Congress, then and
thereupon all right, title, interest, and estate of the United States in said lands shall,
except such part thereof as may be embraced in a public highway legally established
within one year after the date of said decree or forfeiture or abandonment be transferred
to and vested in any person, firm, or corporation, assigns, or successors in title and
interest to whom or to which title of the United States may have been or may be granted,
conveying or purporting to convey the whole of the legal subdivision or subdivisions
traversed or occupied by such railroad or railroad structures of any kind as aforesaid,
except lands within a municipality the title to which, upon forfeiture or abandonment, as
herein provided, shall vest in such municipality, and this by virtue of the patent thereto
and without the necessity of any other or further conveyance or assurance of any kind or
nature whatsoever ....
43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000).
99 Notably, ICC/STB determinations of abandonment do not constitute a determination by a
"court of competent jurisdiction or Act of Congress" for purposes of triggering section 912.
Barney v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 490 N.W.2d 726, 732 (S.D. 1992), rev'd on other grounds,
Brown v. N. Hills Reg'l R.R. Auth., 732 N.W.2d 732 (S.D. 2007); Kaubisch v. South Dakota, 507
U.S. 914 (1993); Brown v. N. Hills Reg'l R.R. Auth., 732 N.W.2d 732 (S.D. 2007); Phillips Co. v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 97 F.3d 1375, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing that ICC
authorization is a component of such a determination).
100 General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000).
101 Id; King County v. Burlington N. R.R. Corp., 885 F. Supp. 1419, 1423, 1425 (W.D. Wash.
1994); Vieux v. E. Bay Reg'l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1341 (9th Cir. 1990). Consent is also
provided from the U.S. government to any railroad or canal company to transfer its property
rights in any federally granted right-of-way to the state highway department of any state, or
its nominee. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, 23 U.S.C. § 316 (2000); 43 U.S.C.
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lands within the corporate limits of a municipality would vest in that
municipality. 102 If neither exception applied or if no abandonment is
declared by a court or act of Congress, then the reverted fee would transfer
to the adjacent landowners who would be the successor in interest to the
patentees of the legal subdivision through which the right-of-way passed,
one year after abandonment. 10 Legislative history behind section 912
indicates that Congress saw no difference between the different eras of
railroad land grants." 4 Those deemed to be fee simple absolute in the
railroad were not subject to section 912, but those deemed to have an
implied limitation of reverter would return to federal control upon
abandonment, to be disposed of according to section 912.10
The policy of section 912 was clear: if the railroad corridor could be put
to public highway or public municipal use, it should remain in the public
domain; but if another public use was unlikely, then it should be returned to
the owner of the land from whom it was taken after the railroad use ceased
and a determination was made that no subsequent public use was needed. 6
That policy accurately reflected federal land policies throughout most of the
twentieth century, but would prove inconsistent with the dawning
awareness that publicly funded transportation corridors, once destroyed,
would be virtually impossible to reassemble. Hence, in 1988, the National
Trails System Act 0 7 was amended to provide for the retention of the
government's reversionary interests in these FGROWs. 0 s It now states that
any railroad right-of-way, upon abandonment, would be retained by the
federal government if not converted to a public highway within one year. 9
§ 913 (2000) (allowing for transfers to states, counties, or municipalities for conversion to a
public highway).
102 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000); City of Maroa v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 592 N.E.2d 660, 667 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992); City of Buckley v. Burlington N. R.R. Corp., 723 P.2d 434, 437 (Wash. 1986).
103 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000).
104 See H.R. REP. No. 67-217, at 1-2 (1921) (stating that "[ulpon abandonment or forfeiture...
of any portions of such right of way, the land reverts to and becomes the property of the United
States," despite the fact that,"[iln some cases a right of way was granted by the Government and
later forfeited, while in other cases change in the location of the railroad resulted in the
abandonment of the old right of way").
105 This included the transcontinental grants like that in Townsend as well as the 1875 Act
grants in Stringham. In fact, legislative history of the 1922 Act shows that Congress was
responding to the newly-articulated defeasible fee interests from Townsend and StrhLham. See
H.R. REP. No. 67-217, at 2 (1921) (including a letter from E.C. Finney, Acting Secretary of the
Interior, to N.J. Sinnot, Chairman of the Commission on the Public Lands, referencing the
Townsend and Strkfngam cases).
106 S. REP. No. 67-388, at 2 (1922); H.R. REP. No. 67-217, at 2 (1921).
107 Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-51
(2000)).
108 National Trails System Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100A70, 102 Stat. 2281
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) (2000)).
109 National Trails System Improvements Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) (2000) ("Commencing
October 4, 1988, any and all right, title, interest, and estate of the United States in all rights-of-way
of the type described in section 912 of title 43, shall remain in the United States upon the
abandonment or forfeiture of such rights-of-way, or portions thereof, except to the extent that any
such right-of-way, or portion thereof, is embraced within a public highway no later than one year
after a determination of abandonment or forfeiture, as provided under such section.").
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These retained rights may be used for the location of recreational trails
pursuant to a grant by the Secretary of the Interior. 0 This provision also
was necessitated by the awareness that the railbanking policy, which
allowed corridors to remain intact for future reactivation, was contradicted
by federal land policies that allowed the destruction of the very corridors
Congress was trying to save.'I'
All of this made perfect sense when one considers the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the property rights granted under these federal right-of-
way statutes at the time section 912 was passed. If they were fee simple
absolute, then the federal government retained no interests and the railroad
could freely sell the corridor for highway, trail, or any other private use;
whereas if they were held as limited fees or defeasible fees, then the future
interest retained by the government would ripen upon abandonment to fee
ownership that could be transferred for use as a public highway or could be
transferred to the patentee."' After 1988, with the change in policy toward
protecting railroad corridors and in support of the National Trails System
Act, the reverted FGROW would be retained for purposes of public trail
development, or shifted to use as a public highway, all in a manner
consistent with the public character of these grants and with an eye toward
retaining corridors intact for future transportation uses."3
The entire logic of section 912 was called into question, however, when
the Supreme Court reversed its interpretation of these rights-of-way in a
series of cases involving challenges to control over mineral rights."' In 1942,
Stringham was reversed in Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States
(Great Northern), 15 where the Court held that an 1875 grant to the Great
* 110 Id § 1248(a).
111 Dave v. Rails to Trails Conservancy, 863 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (quoting
the ICC's Notice of Interim Trail Use); Beres v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 403, 427-28 (Fed. C1.
2005) (denying the government a reversionary interest in certain land). See also the legislative
history of the 1988 Amendments where the Comnittee on Energy and Natural Resources,
noting that these rights-of-way "may have continuing multiple use values, (e.g. utility corridors),
which should be fully examined before the right-of-way is conveyed out of federal ownership,"
sought to restrict the ability of the Secretary to dispose of these rights-of-way only to times in
which such disposal "will serve important public objectives." 8. REP. No. 100408, at 5 (1988),
repnlntedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2607, 2609-10.
112 See Kirk v. Schultz, 119 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Idaho 1941); Wash. Wildlife Pres., Inc. v.
Minnesota, 329 N.W.2d 543, 545-46, 548 (Minn. 1983). But see Polnow v. Wis. Dep't of Natural
Res., 276 N.W.2d 738, 744-47 (Wis. 1979) (finding that trail use was not consistent with public
highway use).
113 S. REP. No. 100-408, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2607, 2608 (noting that
"Congress has acted on other occasions to promote other public uses of abandoned railroad
rights-of-way").
114 Section 912 speaks of vesting, and since an easement is not vested when it terminates, the
language of section 912 became arguably inexact, though courts continued to apply section 912
to 1875 Act easements as well as 1862-1871 defeasible fee interests. See, eg, Vieux v. E. Bay
Reg'l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); Idaho v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 617 F.
Supp. 207, 212 (D. Idaho 1985); Mauler v. Bayfield County, 309 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2002);
Marshall v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 31 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 1994).
115 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
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Northern Railroad conveyed an easement and not a limited fee."' This case
is the first indication that federal rights-of-way might not be deemed fee
interests, but rather mere easements when claims to subsurface mineral
rights were involved." 7 This change in interpretation was made possible in
large part by the gradual recognition of a new property right, the robust
exclusive railroad easement (as distinct from the common law non-exclusive
easement that would have been inadequate for a railroad's needs).1 ' The
Court also changed its interpretation of the railroad grant on the basis of
changed legislative attitudes toward the railroads between 1871 and 1875, as
signaled by the end of the checkerboard grants.1 '
There are numerous problems with the Great Northern decision, not
least of which is its failure to acknowledge the fact that all federal railroad
grants of right-of-way across the public lands had used the same term-a
"right-of-way"-and so it made little sense to identify some as fee simple
absolute, some as fee simple determinable, and others as easements. To
justify a finding that different property rights were intended despite use of
the same property terminology, the Court had to rely on changing legislative
attitudes that somehow could be characterized as evidencing intent to create
three distinct property interests. But of course, there is no such legislative
history, 2 ° and the fact that Congress discontinued the checkerboard grants
does not mean it intended to give a different property right to the railroads
in their corridor grants, especially since Congress did know how to limit
corridor grants to easements, which it routinely did in legislation pertaining
to railroad access across Indian lands. 2 '
The Court also failed to address the implications of its new decision on
section 912. If the retained federal interest was now a servient fee and not a
possibility of reverter, then there would be no revesting of the present estate
in the federal government to trigger the application of section 912 when a
railroad abandoned its FGROW grant.122 So a number of possibilities were
116 Id at 271, 279.
117 Although railroad grants over Indian lands had been held to be easements according to
Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490, 498 (1893), the federal courts had not held traditional FGROW
to be anything less than a fee, though Department of the Interior decisions had been leaning
toward easement interpretations. See, e.g, Pensacola & Louisville R.R. Co., 19 Pub. Lands Dec.
386, 388 (1894); John W. Wehn, 32 Pub. Lands Dec. 33, 34 (1903). But see A. Otis Birch & M.
Estelle C. Birch, 53 Interior Dec. 340, 345-46 (1931) (holding that the government did not part
with its interest when patenting the subdivisions traversed by the railroad corridor).
118 See Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 275-79. With the new railroad easement the courts could
protect a railroad's present possessory use while denying it the right to excavate minerals or engage
in other non-railroad uses-and the easement retained the important characteristic of causing
possession to return to the person or entity that originally granted the easement See id at 272, 279.
119 Id. at 273-74.
120. Id at 272-277. The Court cited a plethora of legislative history on the growing
discontentment with the checkerboard grants, but none of this history indicates an intention to
grant a different property right in the right-of-way.
121 See discussion in/in notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
122 Section 912 speaks of vesting:
Whenever public lands of the United States have been or may be granted to any railroad
company for use as a right of way.., and use and occupancy of said lands for such
2008]
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left unresolved in Great Northern. Either section 912 (which spoke of
vesting the government's interest in various transferees after abandonment)
applies only to an FGROW held as fee simple determinable and not those
now discovered to be held as easements, in which case the applicability of
section 912 would be greatly diminished. Or, section 912 would continue to
apply to both servient fee and reversionary interests, regardless of whether
the FGROW was a defeasible fee or an easement, and federal rights in
FGROW would not vest in anyone else until after abandonment and the
removal of the railroad's use, thus maintaining federal control and not
rendering a Congressional act irrelevant. Or, section 912 would apply only to
FGROW lands that had not been patented out to homesteaders after the
railroad grant but before the railroad abandoned, thus limiting its
applicability to only those adjacent lands still retained in federal ownership.
This last argument, which makes section 912 virtually meaningless, is the
one adopted by the court in Hash, and makes no sense on numerous levels.
In reversing Townsend, the Great Northern Court was following a
trend occurring in the states, that of gradually curtailing railroad property
rights at a time when the railroads were pushing the boundaries of their
rights as they branched out into new practices in order to remain
profitable. 2 3 Ultimately it was the rise of the internal combustion engine
that dramatically increased the demand for gasoline, and the new
technology to store and transfer large quantities of natural gas for urban
consumption, which led railroads to expand into the oil and gas
business.'24 But unlike coal, the energy source of the nineteenth century,
oil and gas are migratory and can be exploited through a single well, which
can draw out the minerals underlying vast areas of land. Thus, a railroad
corridor 200 feet wide became an ideal location for dropping a string of oil
wells across the oil producing states, which allowed railroad companies to
extract oil from under the lands of neighboring private ranchers and land
owners. Because the railroads had the capital to invest in high volume
wells, and the ability to transport the oil cheaply to refineries, a railroad
with very limited property holdings could extract oil and gas from under
hundreds of miles of land owned by private individuals. This imbalance in
the ability to compete in the oil and gas market led to many state
regulations limiting railroad exploration, and ultimately drove the shift in
terminology of the railroad's property rights from defeasible fee interests
(that terminated upon abandonment but allowed for the present estate
purposes has ceased or shall hereafter cease, whether by forfeiture or by
abandonment... then and thereupon all right, title, interest, and estate of the United
States in said lands shall... be transferred to vested in any person, firm, or
corporation... to whom or to which title of the United States may have been or may be
granted ....
43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000). This language clearly contemplates that the government's interest, if any,
does not transfer to or vest until after abandonment. But servient fee interests that underlie
easements do not transfer and vest because they are already vested present estates.
123 See Wright, supra note 2, at 78A-50.
124 Id at 78A-49.
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owner to exploit the minerals) to a railroad easement (that also terminated
upon abandonment, but was limited to a surface transportation use). 125
Ironically, while the driving force behind the shift from defeasible fee
interests to easements was the growing importance of oil and gas production
and the desire to limit railroads in that market, the issues of abandonment
that had been so important in the 1920s were unaffected by the change in
terminology. The ultimate railroad and utility use of the surface was also
unaffected. Yet, in cases today involving the shift from railroad to interim
trail use, courts often rely on the relatively narrow distinctions between
railroad easements and defeasible fees, which arose in the mineral context,
to create distinctions in property rights that frustrate the ability of railroads
and local governments to shift transportation uses to comport with new
needs and technologies. 12
The best way to think about the shift from fee to easement is to follow
the Court's explanation in 1898 that this new railroad easement is
substantially different from a common-law easement, so different that it
looks like a fee simple, because it has the "attributes of the fee, perpetuity
and exclusive use and possession; also the remedies of the fee, and, like it,
corporeal, not incorporeal, property."'27 In essence, the interest is a limited
fee for railroad purposes (minerals are not a railroad purpose) that
terminates upon discontinuation of railroad use. The unfortunate use of the
term "easement," however, has proved to have far greater consequences
than the Court foresaw in 1942. This difficulty in labeling the federal right-of-
way continues today, with comments'such as the following:
For the purposes of this case, we are not impressed with the labels applied to the
title of the railroads in their rights-of-way across the public lands of the United
States. The concept of 'limited fee' was no doubt applied in Townsend because
under the common law an easement was an incorporeal hereditament which did
not give an exclusive right of possession. With the expansion of the meaning of
easement to include, so far as railroads are concerned, a right in perpetuity to
exclusive use and possession the need for the "limited fee" label disappeared. 128
125 Id at 78A-50.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 119-20 (1957); Energy Transp.
Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606 F.2d 934, 936-37 (10th Cir. 1979); Energy Transp. Sys., Inc.
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 619 F.2d 696, 697-99 (8th Cir. 1980).
127 New Mexico v. U.S. Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 183 (1898). The Supreme Court has noted that
"[a] railroad right-of-way is a very substantial thing. It is more than a mere right of passage. It is
more than an easement." W. Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 540, 570 (1904). The
Court also noted that a federally granted right-of-way is "more than an ordinary easement." New
Mexico v. U.S. Trust Co., 172 U.S. at 183. Most courts have not distinguished between limited
fee interests and easements under these federal railroad grants because the exclusive rights of
the railroads in both comport with corporeal property rights and remedies.
128 Wyoming v. Udall, 379 F.2d 635, 640 (10th Cir. 1967) (internal citations omitted). Note,
too, that the difference between a non-presently possessory fee interest (what is left after a
railroad easement is taken out) and a reverter interest (what is left after a limited fee is taken
out) is extremely hard to identify.
2008]
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To justify its decision of cutting back the railroad's property rights from
a fee to an easement, the Court in Great Northern relied extensively on what
it perceived to be a shift in federal policy from the relatively generous 1862-
1871 land grants (that included the checkerboard grants-in-aid) to the
relatively stingy 1875 Act (that merely gave rights-of-Way). 129 The Court
assumed that the change in policy indicated a retrenchment of federal
support consistent with a grant of an easement rather than a fee.13 0 The
Great Northern Court did not discuss the issue of whether the 1862-1871
grants should also be deemed easements, nor did it seem concerned by the
fact that the right-of-way provisions of all the statutes are virtually identical
and that there is no legislative history indicating that a different property
right was intended for the corridor land. The Court also did not discuss the
implications of its decision on the applicability of section 912. Some of these
issues arose and were resolved by lower courts, but the Supreme Court has
been remarkably unhelpful in settling these questions.13 '
In 1957, the Court faced in United States v. Union Pacific Railroad (Union
Pacific)'32 the issue left open in Great Northern-whether 1862-1871 grants
were also to be redefined as easements or would remain limited fees.1 "
Ultimately the Court declined to answer the question. It interpreted the right-
of-way under the 1862 Union Pacific grant to exclude mineral rights, but it did
not explicitly hold that the right-of-way conveyed only an easement,
essentially punting on the issue left open in Great Northern.14 In a very cogent
dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justices Burton and Harlan,.
argued that the Court should at least continue to recognize a distinction
between pre-1871 grants as limited fees and post-1875 grants as easements,
thus maintaining the viability of Townsend, even though Stringham would no
longer be good law. 3 ' Surprisingly, the majority did not disagree and overrule
Townsend, nor did they even acknowledge the overarching issue of whether
pre-1871 grants should be easements. The majority opinion avoided the issue
altogether of what the railroad's interests were, holding simply that whatever
the railroad had, it did not include minerals.
The decision in Great Northern, which held that these rights-of-way
were easements rather than limited fees, created a logical conundrum from
which the courts are having a difficult time extricating themselves, If the
Court premised the reinterpretation of the railroad's rights-from a
defeasible fee with a reverter to an easement-as being the logical result of
shifting political attitudes between 1871 (the last of the grants-in-aid) and
1875 (when only rights-of-way were granted), it is ironic that little attention
was given to the fact that the same term was used throughout all federal
129 Great Northern, 315 U.S. 262, 275 (1942).
130 Id.
131 Vieux v. E. Bay Reg'I Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); Idaho v. Or. Short
Line R.R. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207, 210-12 (D. Idaho 1985); Marshall v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 31.
F.3d 1028, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 1994).
132 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
133 Id at 119.
134 Id. at 120.
135 Id. at 120-37 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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grants and that no change in policy regarding corridor access was evident,
even if there was changing policy about the checkerboard grants. 136
Moreover, courts now have to grapple with whether the federally-retained
interest in an easement is fundamentally different from the retained interest
in a defeasible fee, even though the railroad's rights look quite similar. On
top of that issue, courts have then been faced with deciding if section 912
applies differently to the two interests. 3 7 Additionally, after the Hash
decision, courts have had to decide if the federal retained interest in 1875
Act easements passed to patentees, if 1862-1871 retained interests passed,
or if no interest passes until abandonment and the application of section 912.
In any event, later courts have consistently held that rights-of-way
granted pursuant to the 1875 Act" 3 convey only an easement, although they
have not identified what corresponding interest the government retained. 3 '
At the same time, courts following the 1957 Union Pacific decision have held
that the land conveyed as right-of-way under the 1862 and 1866 Union
Pacific grants conveyed fee simple absolute in some instances, 4 0 an
easement in others,1 4 1 or "a limited fee or an easement" in others. 142 With no
further guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts dealing with
challenges by adjacent landowners claiming rights in FGROW by virtue of
their patents have been rebuffed. Consequently, little clarity has been
created in understanding how the differences between easements and
defeasible fees function for abandonment under section 912, railbanking,
and interim trail use.
IV. ABANDONMENT, RAILBANIING, AND JUST COMPENSATION
As noted above, abandonment is the legal event that triggers the
termination of railroad property rights in FGROW held as easements or
defeasible fees after 1920. Currently, the Surface Transportation Board
136 The fact that Congress used very different terminology in the railroad corridor grants
over Indian lands indicates that Congress knew how to create easements. The fact that
Congress used the term "right-of-way" for all the grants over public lands indicates that the
same interest was intended, even if Congress wanted to retreat from its generous checkerboard
grants. See infa note 235-38 and accompanying text.
137 See discussion infra Part VIII.
138 Ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482 (codified as amended at General Railroad Right of Way Act of 1875,
43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (2000)).
139 Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1311-23 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Boise Cascade Corp. v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 630 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1980); Wyoming v. Andrus, 602 F.2d 1379, 1380-
85 (10th Cir. 1979); Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 253 F.2d 468, 470-73 (10th Cir. 1958).
140 Miss., Kans., & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Early, 641 F.2d 856, 856-60 (10th Cir. 1981); Union Pac.
R.R. Co. v. Atoka, 6 Fed. App'x 725, 726 (10th Cir. 2001).
141 Energy Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 619 F.2d 696, 696-97 (8th Cir. 1980);
Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Town of Maysville, 249 F.2d 542, 545-46 (10th Cir. 1957); Hallaba v.
Worldcom Network Servs., Inc., 196 F.R.D. 630, 638 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (stating that Union Pacfic
held that pre-1871 grants were easements); Burke v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 324 F. Supp.
1125, 1129 (S.D. Ala: 1971) (stating that dicta in Union Pacific indicates that pre-1866 grants
were easements).
142 Sand Springs Home v. Oklahoma, 536 P.2d 1280, 1280, 1284 (Okla. 1975).
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(STB, the successor to the ICC) has jurisdiction over the abandonment
process. Thus, when a railroad believes that it needs to abandon a line, and
there is no negative impact on the public, it will be permitted to discontinue
services on that line. Abandonment authorization is granted, but
abandonment itself, sufficient to remove federal STB jurisdiction over the
line, does not occur until the railroad submits a letter stating that it has
consummated its abandonment of the line.'" If that letter is not submitted
within one year of the issuance of the abandonment certificate, the
certificate is nullified and the rail line remains on the active rail network. 145
If at any time before the final letter of consummation is submitted, a railroad
negotiates to sell its corridor for interim trail use or decides that it would
like to retain an interest in the corridor by banking it, it may request that the
STB issue a railbanking order instead.1
46
Railbanking is an innovative way to preserve rail corridors that in the
past would have been broken up and destroyed upon abandonment. Instead
of walking away from its corridor land, pursuant to the 1983 NTSA
amendments,'47 a railroad may enter into a railbanking/interim trail use
agreement with a trail sponsor to transfer the corridor for trail use while
retaining a right to reenter and retake the corridor land if the railroad wishes
to reactivate the corridor for future railroad use.14" This ingenious device
allows for the preservation of the rail corridor for future transportation
needs, it preempts the destruction of the railroad's property rights under
state law because federal STB jurisdiction remains over the corridor so long
143 See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803, 932-33 (1995)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 701 (2000)) (replacing the Interstate Commerce Commission with the
Surface Transportation Board (STB), which is under the purview of the Department of
Transportation).
144 Until 1984, railroads were required to notify the ICC that they had consummated their
abandonment of lines by submission of a letter or statement confirming the abandonment.
Because of the confusion that occurred when abandonment authorization was granted and the
actions of the railroads regarding consummation were unclear, the STB issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking to require a notice of consummation. Abandonment and Discontinuance
of Rail Lines and Rail Transportation Under 49 U.S.C. 10903, 61 Fed. Reg. 11,174, 11,177-78
(proposed Mar. 19, 1996). That rule was adopted and is currently in place at 49 C.F.R.
§ 1152.29(e)(2) (2007). See Birt v. STB, 90 F.3d 580, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1996); CONRAIL v. STB, 93
F.3d 793, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
145 See, e.g., Birt v. STB, 90 F.3d at 586, 590; Buffalo Twp. v. Jones, 813 A.2d 659, 664 (Pa.
2002); Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1094-1095 (Md. 1999).
146 See Prospective Use of Rights-of-Way for Interim Trail Use and Rail Banking, 49 C.F.R.
§ 1152.29 (2007); Exempt Abandonments and Discontinuances of Service and Trackage Rights,
49 C.F.R. § 1152.50 (2007); STB Rail Abandonments--Use of Rights-of-Ways as Trails (49 C.F.R.
Parts 1105 & 1152), 2 I.C.C.2d 591, 609-13. (1986); STB Rail Abandonments-Use of Rights-of-
Ways as Trails-Supplemental Trails Act Procedures, 4 I.C.C.2d 152, 157-58 (1987).
147 National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11, § 208, 97 Stat. 42, 48
(1983) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000)).
148 See49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(3) (2007) (requiring that trail purchaser acknowledge railroad's
rights to re-activate); see also Danaya C. Wright and Scott A. Bowman, Charitable Deductions
for Radi-Tail Conversions Reconcdln the Partial Interest Rule and the National Trails System
Ac; 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 581, 586-91, 627-28 (2008) (including a discussion of
the nature of the property right retained by the railroads when they railbank their corridors).
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as it is railbanked, and interim trail use can be made of the corridor which
enhances quality of life for residents nearby.
The railbanking statute, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), provides that:
Consistent with the purposes of [the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1976 (45 U.S.C.A § 801 et seq.)], and in furtherance of the national
policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail
service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient
transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-
way pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner
consistent with this chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or
reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for
purposes of any law or rule of law,1 4 9 as an abandonment of the use of such
rights-of-way for railroad purposes. If a State, political subdivision, or qualified
private organization is prepared to assume full responsibility for management of
such rights-of-way and for any legal liability arising out of such transfer or use,
and for the payment of any and all taxes that may be levied or assessed against
such rights-of-way, then the Board shall impose such terms and conditions as a
requirement of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a manner consistent
with this chapter, and shall not permit abandonment or discontinuance
inconsistent or disruptive of such use. 150
-By explicitly halting the abandonment process, this statute allows railroads
to prevent the removal of federal jurisdiction and thus the reinstitution of
state property law rules that might lead to the extinguishment of their
property rights in the corridor land.
Numerous adjacent landowners, however, upset that their expectations
of receiving the corridor land upon railroad abandonment have been
frustrated, have ified takings claims against the federal statute. In these
claims, landowners allege that but for the railbanling process, they would
have received property that is now indefinitely being used. for public trail
purposes.' Although the NTSA amendments allowing for railbanking and
interim trail use were upheld in 1990 by the Supreme Court in Preseault v.
ICC,152 the Court remanded on the question of whether the landowners were
entitled to compensation due to the postponement of their receiving
possessory rights to rail corridor land.'" Eventually it was determined that
the Preseaults themselves were entitled to compensation because in the
State of Vermont their reverter or servient fee rights in the rail corridor were
149 Presumably this applies to federal laws as well. See e.g, RLTD Ry. Corp. v. STB, 166 F.3d
808, 806-07 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing the application of federal law to abandonment
proceedings).
150 National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
151 See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1996), damages
determined at 52 Fed. Cl. 667 (Fed. Cl. 2002); Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 771, 778
(Fed. Cl. 2000); Moore v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 747, 755 (Fed. Cl. 2002); Lowers v. United
States, 663 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Iowa 2003); Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
152 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
153 Id at 17.
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deemed robust enough to justify compensation when the trail preempted
their ability to retake possession of the corridor. 1' But other states have
determined that under their state law, railroad easements are robust enough,
and adjacent landowner rights in rail corridors are weak enough, that
compensation is not due when the corridor is railbanked. 155 Thus, each
railbanked corridor that is challenged has to be litigated on its merits to
determine if a taking has occurred.
The primary distinction between state laws that would require
compensation and those that do not has to do with state-law definitions of the
scope of the general railroad easement. Thus, in some states, like Missouri,
Kansas, and Vermont, courts have determined that the scope of the railroad
easement under state law is not sufficiently robust to permit a change in use
from railroad to interim trails. 6 But in other states, like Maryland, Minnesota,
and Ohio, courts have held that railroad easements are extensive transportation
rights that will adjust to shifting public needs and technologies.1 57
Until recently, however, corridors that consisted of FGROW, which are
not subject to state-law definitions of property rights, were deemed to be
less susceptible to a takings challenge precisely because the federal
government was deemed to have retained either the servient fee or
reversionary interest in all FGROW (at least all of those not held to have
been in fee simple absolute) and the federal government could certainly
authorize railbanking of the corridor and interim trail use without injury to
its own property interests.'58 Concomitantly, the federal government was
certainly within its rights to amend section 912 in 1988 to retain its interests
in FGROW for railbanking purposes rather than allowing them to vest in
adjacent landowners one year after abandonment. The public highway and
municipality provisions of section 912 indicated that Congress intended the
FGROWs to be used for public purposes, and the 1988 NTSA amendments
15 9
extended that public purpose to include interim rail-trail use. 60
154 See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1552.
155 See, e.g, Lowers v. United States, 663 N.W.2d at 410; Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United
States, 37 Fed. Cl. 545, 598-599 (Fed. Cl. 1997); Wash. Wildlife Pres. Inc. v. Minnesota, 329
N.W.2d 543, 548 (Minn. 1983) (holding that because the easement is robust enough, there was
no abandonment upon conversion-thus, no takings liability would result).
156 See Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. at 772; Swisher v. United States, 262 F. Supp.
2d 1203, 1207 (D. Kan. 2003); Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1529.
157 See Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1077 (Md. App. 1999) (holding
that a railroad right of way is an easement encompassing use as a recreational trail); Wash.
Wildlife Pres. Inc. v. Minnesota, 329 N.W.2d at 547 (holding that use of railroad right of way is
not limited "strictly to railroad purposes" and that use as a trail is compatible with original
transportation purpose); Rieger v. Pa. Cent. Corp., No. 85-CA-11, 1985 WL 7919, at *6 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 21, 1985) (holding that use of right-of-way as a trail does not exceed scope of
easement).
158 Hash v. United States, No. CV 99-324-S-MHW, 2001 WL 35986188, at *3-4 (D. Idaho Nov.
27, 2001).
159 National Trails System Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-470, 102 Stat. 2281
(1988) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241, 1244,1248 (2000)).
160 S. REP. No. 100-408, at 3 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2607, 2607.
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V. HASH V UNITED STATES
The challenge against the FGROW in Hash arose out of a typical trail-
wide class action suit, filed by a set of attorneys who have made a business
of challenging the railbanking statute in numerous state and nation-wide
class actions,161 alleging it works a taking in all cases, regardless of the
railroads' property interests and the adjacent landowners' interests.162 In this
case, a portion of the trail at issue in Idaho was established on land that was
originally granted to the railroad by an 1875 federal grant."( The Pacific and
Idaho Northern Railroad was constructed between 1899 and 1911, and
discontinued in 1995 when it railbanked the 83-mile corridor and entered
into a trail use agreement."M The trial court held that there was no taking of
adjacent landowners' property when the corridor was railbanked for those
landowners adjacent to FGROW because the federal government held the
servient fee interest in the right-of-way. 165 Because the government retained
its servient fee interests, the landowners had no property rights in the
corridor land and thus had no standing to challenge the conversion to a
trail.166 Upon abandonment the FGROW would pass back to the federal
government, and there was no taking if the government chose to retain it
and allow trail use rather than dispose of its interest to adjacent landowners.
The Hash plaintiffs, however, alleged that, as successors to homestead
patentees, they had received the servient fee interest as part of the patent
underlying the FGROW when the original patent was issued in the late
nineteenth century. They based their argument on the fact that the
reservations and exceptions provisions in the original patent merely
excepted out the railroad's interest in the right-of-way. 167 Because the
161 See Ackerson Kauffman Fex Attorneys, Rails-to-Trails, http://www.ackersonlaw.com/
railstotrails.html (last visited July 20, 2008) (describing the firm's Rails-to-Trails practice area); Zelle
Hoffman Voelbel Mason & Gette, Real Estate Litigation, http://www.zelle.conpractices-30.htm (last
visited July 20, 2008) (discussing their nation-wide class action work against railroads).
162 Many of these cases have been resolved on procedural grounds and others on scope of
the easement grounds. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 193, 203-04 (Fed. Cl.
2003), affd 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
when statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs taking claim after railroad easement was
converted to a trail); Barclay v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1180 (D. Kan. 2006), aft'd,
443 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 U.S. 1328 (2007) (claim barred by statute of
limitations); Renewal Body Works v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 609, 613-14 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
Others, however, have required that the courts look at every deed for each portion of the rail
corridor in the state. See, e.g., State ex re. Firestone v. Parke Circuit Court, 621 N.E.2d 1113
(Ind. 1993) (affirming consolidation of two class actions brought to quiet title, and eventually
resulting in settlement); Maas v. Penn Cent. Corp., No. 2006-T-0067, 2007 WL 1241336 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 27, 2007) (affirming lower court class certification while evaluating claims on a deed-
by-deed basis); Hash v. United States, 2001 WL 35986188. Trail-wide class actions are tedious-
the Hash case demonstrates the variety of different state-wide claims that plaintiffs must often
address along with the FGROW issue.
163 Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
164 Id. at 1311.
165 Hash v. United States, 2001 WL 35986188, at *9.
166 Id
167 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19-24, Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (No. 03-1395), 2003 WL 25291551.
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government did not also except out its servient fee interest in the FGROW,
they claimed, that interest passed via the patent. 168
The issue is deceptively simple. If the railroad acquired only an
easement from the federal grant, then the servient fee interest was retained
by the government. That interest was either conveyed by a subsequent
patent to a homesteader, or excepted out of patents and retained by the
government to be used or disposed of as the government saw fit. If the
former, then the United States has no interest in the underlying fee of these
FGROWs (though it might still have an interest in the right-of-way itself);'69 if
the latter, then land patentees have no interest in the underlying fee and
Congress can amend its laws to dispose of or retain that interest as national
transportation needs dictate. If the former, then land patentees will be able
to acquire possession of FGROW land when the railroad abandons it; if the
latter, then the government can authorize its use for other public municipal,
highway, or trails purposes upon abandonment.
The landowners' argument raises a number of red flags, however. First,
if the patent had issued prior to 1903 and the Townsend decision, the
railroad would have been deemed to have had fee simple absolute title to the
FGROW and no interest in the right-of-way would have passed via the
patent. 7 ° Similarly, if the patent issued between 1903 and 1942, when the
government learned that the interests given to the railroads in FGROW were
often defeasible fees, and that it had retained a reversionary interest, the
government would most likely not have needed to explicitly retain that
interest because reverter interests were generally nontransferable. 171
Certainly, after 1942, when the government learned that it was actually
granting easements, it should have reserved its servient fee interests when it
issued patents-but of course by then most patents had been issued and
federal policy toward homesteading had changed. 72 Thus, because the
Supreme Court changed its interpretation from a fee simple absolute, to a
fee simple determinable, and then to an easement, the retained interests
168 Id
169 See discussion nfm Part IX.
170 When the government issued its patents "excepting" out the railroad right-of-way, if the
railroad's grant was fee simple absolute, the exception clause would necessarily mean that no
interests in the corridor could pass to the patentees because it had already been granted out of
federal ownership via fee simple absolute grants to the railroads. See Townsend, 190 U.S. 267,
270 (1903) (holding that homesteaders did not receive any interest in the railroad right-of-way).
171 The government would have retained a possibility of reverter that would not have been
transferable until the mid-twentieth century with the advent of marketable title acts. Prior to
that, most states held that reversionary interests were nontransferable. While there was no
federal law on federally-created reversionary interests, the common legal understanding of the
nature of reversionary interests would be that it would not transfer with the transfer of
adjoining land. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 159-60 (1936) (collecting cases).
Although the Restatement was moving toward the position of allowing the free alienation of
reversionary interests, the cases cited almost uniformly prevented the alienation of the
reversionary interests. As the Restatement indicates, reversionary interests were still non-
alienable in 1936. Id
172 See GATES, supra note 11, at 495-529 (discussing homesteading and providing a chart
showing the complete cessation of land entries after 1943).
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changed as well. And what neither the Supreme Court nor the Hash court
acknowledged is that the differences in retained interests do matter when
we consider whether or not exceptions and reservations in deeds cause the
transfer of those interests. 173 Yet the Hash court completely ignored
dramatic shifts in property rights interpretation in 1903 and 1942. By holding
that the failure to reserve the retained interest constituted a grant to the
patentees, the court elided the important differences between reversionary
interests and servient fee interests.
7 4
Besides eliding the differences in retained interests, the Hash court also
relied on the wrong statute. In 1906, Congress passed 43 U.S.C. § 940, which
provided that any railroad that received FGROW and failed to construct its
road within five years would find its interests forfeited back to the United
States.1 75 This is a statute dealing with forfeitures for breach of contract, not
for abandonment. The abandonment statute, 43 U.S.C. § 912, clearly posits
that once the FGROW has vested in the railroad, its interests can be defeated
only upon a finding of abandonment by an act of Congress or court of
competent jurisdiction. The Hash court calls section 912 merely a quiet title
statute, requiring that the government dispose of its interests, if any, to
adjacent landowners, but in doing so it misses the significance of the public
highway and municipality provisions. If the servient fee had already
transferred to patentees, then section 912 cannot cause the transfer of the
government's interests in FGROW to municipalities or highway departments
without being a taking as well. Either the patentees received the
government's interest in all cases involving subsequent patents and the
highway and municipality provisions are ineffective, or the latter are
effective because the government's interests did not transfer to the
173 Generally, a deed that "excepts" portions is interpreted to exclude entirely all rights of
the grantor in the land so excepted so that the grantee takes nothing in that portion. A deed that
"reserves" a portion is usually interpreted to carve out a smaller interest than an estate,
reserving it for the grantor, while conveying the remainder of the interest associated with the
reserved portion to the grantee. See, e.g., Hinojos v. Lohmann, 182 P.3d 692, 699 (Colo. App.
2008) (discussing distinctions between "exceptions" and "reservations" in the context of an
action brought to quiet title to a railroad right-of-way). See also Celeste M. Hammond, Transfer
by Deed, in 14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, at 81A-104 to 05 (explaining the
difference between exceptions and reservations).
174 See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Easements and Licenses, in 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 2, at 34-11 ("[Plossession and easement-use cannot exist in the same person either
simultaneously or as to the same undivided share"). A fee simple determinable granted to the
railroad would result in a possibility of reverter remaining in the government, while an
easement granted to the railroad would result in the servient fee interest remaining in the
government. The former is a future interest that carries with it the possibility of future
possession. The latter is the vested present estate that will become possessory when the
exclusive railroad easement terminates. See Jd.; Wright, supra note 2, at 78A-41 to -42.
175 The statute provided that upon forfeiture the U.S. would regain
full title to the lands covered thereby free and discharged from such easement, and the
forfeiture declared shall, without need of further assurance or conveyance, inure to the
benefit of any owner or owners of land conveyed by the United States prior to such date
subject to any such grant of right of way or station grounds ....
Act of June 26, 1906, ch. 3550, 34 Stat. 482 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 940 (2000)).
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patentees, and it is only a year after abandonment that adjacent landowners
receive the government's servient fee interest.
This interpretation also goes against a stunning array of precedents
holding that patentees did not receive the federal interest in FGROW, all
without reference to a single case litigating this precise point. 76 It also went
against precedents holding that ambiguities in federal grants should be
resolved in favor of the government. 177 Yet the court in Hash made no
mention of any of these precedents.
Perhaps more troubling, however, is the fact that the Hash court did not
address two critical issues to the case: abandonment and takings liability.
The last paragraph of the section dealing with FGROW, which has acquired a
life of its own, states:
We conclude that the land of Category 1 is owned in fee by the landowners,
subject to the railway easement. The district court's contrary decision is
reversed. On the railway's abandonment of its right-of-way these owners were
disencumbered of the railway easement, and upon conversion of this land to a
public trail, these owners' property interests were taken for public use, in
accordance with the principles set forth in the Preseault cases. On remand the
district court shall determine just compensation on the conditions that apply to
these landowners. 1
78
The first problem is that, regardless of whether the federal interest had
transferred to patentees, the court held that the railroad had indeed
abandoned its FGROW in the absence of a showing that the railroad had
obtained either an act of Congress or a decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction as required by section 912.179 Second, the court failed to address
whether the scope of a FGROW was sufficiently robust to allow a shift from
railroad to trail use without working an abandonment. 8
Ironically, both sides in Hash understood that the issue they appealed was
merely the question of who owned the servient fee interest in FGROW. That
was all they briefed and argued before the court, yet the court held that the
railroad had abandoned its FGROW and ordered compensation for the adjacent
landowners."' Ordering compensation effectively found that the scope of the
FGROW was not sufficiently large to encompass trail use, even though the
176 See discussion infra Part VI.
177 See, e.g, Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 (1919); McDonald v. United States, 119
F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1941).
178 Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
179 While the railroad had obtained STB jurisdiction to abandon, it had railbanked its
corridor which rebuts a finding of abandonment. See discussion ihfra Part VIII.
180 Both of these issues were briefed in the government's motion for reheaing, but the district
court, on remand, gave weight to the denial of the motion for rehearing as expressing somehow the
Federal Circuit's belief in the appropriateness of its conclusion. See Petition of the United States for
Panel Rehearing, Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1395), 2005 WL
4814437; Hash v. United States, No. CV-99-324-S-MHW, 2007 WL 1309548 at *5 (D. Idaho Feb. 1, 2007).
181 Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d at 1318. See also Hash v. United States, 2007 WL 1309548
at *4 ("[T]he Federal Circuit itself, rightly or wrongly, made the liability determination applying
Preseault").
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congressional language of the federal grants clearly indicates that they are
given for multiple transportation and telecommunications purposes."8 2
There are four principle issues that require further discussion. The first is
the homestead precedents ignored by the court. The second is the court's
dismissal of section 912 and its reliance on section 940, the forfeiture statute
rather than the abandonment statute in interpreting the government's retained
interest. The third is the finding that abandonment had occurred without
meeting the criteria of section 912 (act of Congress or determination of a
court). Section 912 has been held to apply to both defeasible fee and easement
FGROW when considering the question of abandonment, and the court's failure
to require fact finding on abandonment was grossly improper. Fourth, the court
ordered compensation, without argument or briefing, which completely
reversed prior decisions holding that compensation is due only upon a
determination that the scope of the easement is inadequate for trail use.
VI. HOMESTEAD PRECEDENTS HOLDING THAT PATENTEES HAVE NO RIGHTS IN
FGROW ABSENT ExPLIcrr LANGUAGE IN THEIR PATENTS
The decision in Hash goes against extensive prior case law finding that
homesteaders obtained no interest in FGROW granted prior to their patents
when the grant was made subject to the FGROW 3 The Supreme Court in
Northern Pacific Railroad v Townsend stated:
[F]iling of the map of definite location, and the construction of the railroad
within the quarter section in question preceded the filing of the homestead
entries on such section, [such that] the land forming the right of way therein
was taken out of the category of public lands subject to preemption and sale,
and the land department was therefore without authority to convey rights
therein. It follows that the homesteaders acquired no interest in the land within
the right of way [just] because of the fact that the grant to them was of the full
legal subdivisions.
1 8 4
Townsendinvolved an adjacent landowner who first claimed an interest in the
FGROW by virtue of his patent, which was promptly rejected, then by virtue of
adverse possession under state law, which was also rejected.18 5 The Court
182 See discussion infra Part XI (examining facial taldngs issues raised by this decision).
183 Although the relevant statutory language requires that Congress issue patents "subject to"
railroad rights-of-way, it appears that many, if not most, patents were issued without any
mention of the right-of-way at all. See, e.g., Energy Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606
F.2d 934, 935 (10th Cir. 1979); Home on the Range v. AT&T Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1001
(S.D. Ind. 2005); Klump v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., No. 4:01-CV-00421-ACM, 2003 WL 24296629, at
*3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2003); Rice v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 254, 255 (D.N.D. 1972) affd, 479
F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1973); Taggert v. Great N. Ry. Co., 208 F. 455 (E.D. Wash. 1912). Despite the
lack of reservations, these courts generally held that the homesteader did not receive any
interest underlying the railroad right-of-way. And when the patent is made subject to the
railroad right-of-way, as in Marshal] v. Chicago and Northwest Transportation Co., 31 F.3d 1028
(10th Cir. 1994), the homesteader was held to have received no interest in the corridor land.
184 Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 270 (1903).
185 Id.
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then went on to hold that the FGROW grant was a limited fee with an implied
condition of reverter and not a fee simple absolute in order to more strongly
insist that the patentee could acquire no rights in the land. 8 For if the railroad
had fee simple absolute, it could transfer the land or a trespasser could
acquire it by prescription. But the limited fee with the implied reverter was
seen to more accurately represent Congress's intention that the land was to be
used for railroad purposes only, and that private individuals should not
interfere with railroad obligations and public transportation policies.
It is ironic that the first shift in Supreme Court interpretations of
FGROW interests involved a challenge by a homesteader. By weakening the
railroad's grant to a limited fee, the Court strengthened the railroad purpose
of the grant-that it must be free from interference by private parties. And
by creating a reverter in the government, the Court protected the corridor
more completely than an absolute fee would because adverse possession
against the sovereign is not permissible." 7 The language in Townsend clearly
indicates that the Court was attempting to better protect not just the
railroad, but Congress's intentions behind these grants, by locating the
property rights squarely in the hands of the railroads and the federal
government. And though some have argued that Townsend has been limited
or partially overruled by Union Pacific, the homesteader provisions have not
been altered or even questioned until this case.188
The Townsend opinion has been followed by numerous other courts. The
District Court for the Northern District of North Dakota in Rice v United
States,i"9 involving a challenge by a homesteader to the 1864 Northern Pacific
grant FGROW, stated that "the Homesteader cannot reasonably have claimed
that in taking a homestead subject to a railroad right of way, he acquired an
interest under the right of way."9 ' The district court in Rice also stated that it
did not matter whether the railroad got a defeasible fee or an easement; the
homesteader received no interest in the FGROW because the government did
not have the authority to convey its underlying interest:
There is no controversy over the fact that the railway got either a limited fee
or an easement. In any event, it got something less than fee simple by the
filing and approval of a right of way plat, and construction of the railway. At
the time of the issuance of the patents, the United States did have an interest
in the right of way. But, if the agency issuing the patent had neither the actual
nor the apparent authority to convey the interest of the United States under
the right of way, then, of course, the deed, although it purported so to do, did
not convey that interest.19 1
186 Id. at 271-272.
187 See Wolf, Adveis Posssion in 16 PowEtL ON REAL PROPERTY, swora note 2, at 91-81 to -82.1
(citing cases discussing the Latin phrase nu]um teputs occuritg [time does not nm against the king]).
188 Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit in Hash did not address this important Supreme
Court decision.
189 348 F. Supp. 254 (D.N.D. 1972).
190 Id. at 257.
191 Id. at 256-57 (citations omitted).
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The Rice court further explained the general rule in existence at the time
of these homestead grants, that "a tract lawfully appropriated to any purpose
becomes thereafter severed from the mass of public lands, and that no
subsequent law or proclamation will be construed to embrace it, or to operate
upon it, although no exception be made of it...." 12The Eighth Circuit
upheld the decision in Rice in its entirety. 193
The Rice court cites Hastings & D.R. Co. v. WitneJ 94 and Wilcox v.
Jackson95 for the rule that once a tract is appropriated for a homesteader, it
cannot be appropriated for the railroad later as part of its grants-in-aid.9 6
Conversely, as applied in Rice, once a tract is appropriated for a railroad
right-of-way, it cannot be appropriated for a homestead, and it would be
unreasonable for a homesteader to believe otherwise." 7 Not only does the
Rice court not distinguish between pre-1871 and 1875 Act railroad grants for
application of this rule, it held that the government's interest in railroad
right-of-way lands, already appropriated to the railroad, do not pass to
homesteaders, even if those interests are not excepted out in the patent."18
This precedent was directly on point and ignored by the Hash court.
The Supreme Court of Colorado followed the Townsend rule that once
the railroad filed its map of definite location and built its road, that land was
removed from the category of public lands subject to sale to homesteaders,
in Kunzman v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.'99 And as recently as 2002, the
Seventh Circuit found that landowners adjacent to land granted in aid of
construction did not receive any rights in the corridor from patents in
Mauler v. Bayield County;,2 °° citing Townsend for that conclusion.2°1 Other
courts have agreed.2 2
Although the issue of patents to 1875 Act lands has not been
painstakingly distinguished from patents to 1862-1871 FGROW grants, courts
have held that homesteaders did not receive the federal government's retained
interests in the 1875 Act lands. In Marshall v. Chicago & Northwestern
Transportation Co.,2 3 a Tenth Circuit panel concluded that the conveyance of
the "whole of the legal subdivision or subdivisions traversed or occupied by
such railroad or railroad structures" did not transfer 1875 Act interests.20 The
192 Id. at 257 (citing Hastings & D.R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357 (1889); Wilcox v. Jackson,
38 U.S. 425 (1839)) (emphasis added).
193 Rice v. United States, 479 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir. 1973).
194 132 U.S. 357 (1889).
195 38 U.S. 425 (1839).
196 Rice v. United States, 348 F. Supp. at 257.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Kunzman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co, 456 P.2d 743, 745-46 (Colo. 1969).
200 Mauler v. Bayfield County, 309 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2002).
201 Id at 1001.
202 See, e.g., Marlow v. Malone, 734 N.E.2d 195, 202-03 (ill. App. Ct. 2000) (concluding that a
landowner claiming title to a right-of-way must produce title to the underlying lands, either
through a U.S. patent, a purported conveyance leading from title granted from the United
States, or any other manner in which state law allows).
203 31 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 1994).
204 Id. at 1032 (quoting section 912 of the 1875 Act).
20081
HeinOnline  -- 38 Envtl. L. 743 2008
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
Supreme Court of Nebraska agreed that the United States's interest in an 1875
Act right-of-way did not pass to homesteaders in Whipps Land & Cattle Co.,
Inc. v. Level 3 Communications, LLC( Whipps).205 While noting that courts "are
divided on that question," it stated that "the prevailing view is that the
underlying interest in active rights-of-way is held by the United States and not
by the adjacent landowner" 26 The Nebraska court noted that only the District
Court of South Dakota has taken the contrary view in City of Aberdeen v.
Chicago & Northwest Tansportation Co. (Aberdeen),2 7 contradicting the
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as the South Dakota and Nebraska
state supreme courts.2 8 Moreover, Aberdeen is of questionable precedential
value because the South Dakota Supreme Court subsequently ruled that
homesteaders have no interest in FGROW grants, as did the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits, all being higher courts to which the district court should defer.20 9
The only other precedent that homesteaders might have received the
government's retained interest is dicta in Wyoming v. Udal,2 1 ° but that
position was rejected by the same court twelve years later in Wyoming v.
AndrUs.211 Moreover, Udal was specifically concerned with whether the
minerals in pre-1871 corridors passed to homesteaders and did not address
1875 Act lands.2 12 Despite dicta that the rule might be different for 1875 Act
lands, the Udall court affirmed the position that
the location of a railroad right-of-way across a tract of public land of the United
States does not separate the servient estate from the public domain with the
result that title to the servient estate passes without express mention in a
subsequent grant by the United States of the traversed tract.
213
Just as the land does not pass to homesteaders, neither do the mineral
205 658 N.W.2d 258, 265 (Neb. 2003).
206 Id
207 602 F. Supp. 589, 593 (D.S.D. 1984) (holding that the United States did not retain a
reversionary interest when it patented land underlying an easement to an individual).
208 Whipps Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, 658 N.W.2d at 265.
209 South Dakota used to be in the Tenth Circuit but is now in the Eighth Circuit. However,
since both have rejected the position taken by the district court, Aberdeen is of little
precedential value. See Barney v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 490 N.W.2d 726, 731 (S.D. 1992);
Marshall v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 31 F.3d at 1032; Rice v. United States, 479 F.2d 58, 59 (8th
Cir. 1973). Based on the decision in Hash, the South Dakota Supreme Court has reversed
Barney in Brown v. N. Hills Reg' R.R. Auth., 732 N.W.2d 732, 739 (S.D. 2007), but for obvious
reasons that does not affect this criticism of Hash;, indeed it further strengthens it. See
discussion infra at Part X.
210 379 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1967).
211 602 F.2d 1379, 1384 (10th Cir. 1979).
212 See Udal, 379 F.2d at 638 (narrowing the question before the court to consideration of
railroad right-of-ways granted by Congress before 1871). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit decision in
Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v Uron Pacific Railroad Co., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979),
which held the patentee did receive the government's servient estate in an 1862 FGROW, did so
on the grounds that the patent did not exclude or reserve the railroad's right-of-way. This error
was the basis on which the servient fee was deemed to pass, and should not be extended to
include patents which do exclude or reserve the railroad's interest.
213 Uda, 379 F.2d at 639-40.
[Vol. 38:711
HeinOnline  -- 38 Envtl. L. 744 2008
THE THREAT TO RAIL- TRAIL CONVERSIONS
rights. The Udall court affirmed the general rule that homesteaders acquired
no federal retained interests unless explicitly stated in the patent.
The refusal of most courts to treat pre-1871 retained interests
differently from 1875 Act retained interests makes sense because the
interests granted to the railroads are substantially the same. The Udall court
explained that the difference in labeling between limited fee and easement
has little substantive meaning.214 The virtual equivalency of the limited fee
without minerals (as defined in Union Pacific for pre-1871 grants) and the
exclusive railroad easement in perpetuity without minerals (as defined in
Great Northern for 1875 Act grants) suggested to this court that at least
whatever interest the federal government retained, it did not pass to
homesteaders without express mention in the patent.215
Some courts have placed great reliance on whether or not the
homestead patent excepts out the right-of-way. For instance, in Energy
Transportation Systems Inc. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,21 6 the Tenth
Circuit ruled that homesteaders received the federal servient estate in a
patent that made no mention of the FGROW at all.2 17 In Marshall, however,
the same circuit excluded the servient fee interest in a homestead patent
that did make the grant subject to the right-of-way.218 This distinction
emphasizes the presence or absence of the "subject to" language at the
expense of the Townsend nile that once the railroad has filed its map of
definite location, that land becomes encumbered in such a way that the
government is without the authority to make subsequent conveyances of the
land.2 19 Certainly if fee simple absolute has already been conveyed, the
government has nothing left to convey to a homesteader and any patents
attempting to do otherwise are simply void.22 ° Townsend indicates that the
214 The court stated:
For the purposes of this case, we are not impressed with the labels applied to the title of
the railroads in their rights-of-way across the public lands of the United States. The
concept of "limited fee" was no doubt applied in Townsend because under the common
law an easement was an incorporeal hereditament which did not give an exclusive right
of possession. With the expansion of the meaning of easement to include, so far as
railroads are concerned, a right in perpetuity to exclusive use and possession the need
for the "limited fee" label disappeared.
Id at 640.
215 Id.
216 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979).
217 Id. at 935-37.
218 Marshall v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 31 F.3d 1028, 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1994).
219 See Rice v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 254, 256 (D.N.D. 1972) (discussing the lower court
decision in Zarak v. Cardinal Petroleum Co., 4 IBLA 83, 89 (1971)). The disagreement between the
Rice court and the special concurrence in Zarak relied on the distinction between mere deed
language, and notions of agency and authority. Id. at 256-57. The Rice court held that the
government land agents were without authority to transfer the government's retained interest in
FGROW, despite absence or presence of particular deed language. Id. at 257.
220 Id. (citing Hastings & D.R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357 (1889) for the rule that "a tract
lawfully appropriated to any purpose becomes thereafter severed from the mass of public lands,
and that no subsequent law or proclamation will be construed to embrace it, or operate upon it,
although no exception be made of it").
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same is true with the defeasible fee interest; the reverter interest retained by
the government is vital to the purpose of the railroad grant and its
conveyance to homesteaders would defeat that purpose. Hence, the
government is without authority to convey it away without defeating the
original railroad grant.
As a general rule, however, courts do distinguish between exceptions and
reservations in deeds, so when the patents "except" out the right-of-way, the
most common understanding of the effect of that language is that the
government's reverter interest does not pass.22' This language, in conjunction
with the rule articulated in Caldwell v. United States,222 that nothing passes
but what is explicitly listed, is consistent in denying that the government's
reverter or servient fee interest passed, unmentioned, to homesteaders.
It is remarkable that the Hash court made no mention of any of these
homestead cases involving precisely the same claims the landowners made.
On the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that homesteaders
acquire no interest in FGROW by virtue of their patent, and other courts
have held that the government was without the power to transfer the
interest underlying the FGROW, even if it purported to do so. The reasoning
of Townsend, however, is most persuasive. To the extent Congress made
these railroad grants to further important public transportation purposes, it
would be contrary to the purpose of the grants to hold that the government's
servient fee interest transferred to patentees. By effectively destroying the
federal interest, the Hash court has hamstrung the government in its ability
to enforce the terms of the grants and promote the policies of the grants.
223
VII. CONGRESS'S SHIFTING RESPONSES TO RAILROAD FORFEITURES AND
ABANDONMENTS
Another criticism of the Hah decision is its reliance on a 1906 forfeiture
statute224 and not the 1922 abandonment statute,22 5 even though the issue in
the case was abandonment and not forfeiture. And although the language of
the two statutes may have fostered such reliance, an understanding of the
history of railroad grants and railroad legislation shows the grave error the
court made. The 1875 Act provided that upon filing a map of definite location,
that land would be noted on the land registers so that subsequent land grants
would be made subject to the railroad right-of-way. 2 1 More important,
221 See, e.g., Peck v. McClelland, 225 N.W. 514, 515 (Mich. 1929); In re Estate of Harding, 878
A.2d 201, 204 (Vt. 2005); Green v. Alvesteffer, No. 259947, 2006 WL 2380774, at *2, *4 (Mich. App.
Aug. 17, 2006). Courts have also recognized that exception and reservation clauses put grantees
on notice to investigate the title that may be excluded from their grant. See Coming v. Lehigh
Vail. R.R. Co., 14 A.D.2d 156, 164 (N.Y. App. D. 1961). But see Pollnow v. State Dep't of Natural
Res., 276 N.W.2d 738, 747 (Wis. 1979).
222 250 U.S. 14,20 (1919)
223 See discussion &afr Part IX (analyzing the scope of the FGROW held as easements).
224 43 U.S.C. § 940 (2000).
225 Id. § 912.
226 General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482, 483 (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. § 937 (2000)).
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however, the statute noted that "if any section of said road shall not be
completed within five years after the location of said section, the rights herein
granted shall be forfeited as to any such uncompleted section of said road."227
This forfeiture provision of the 1875 Act, however, was not self-executing,
and required a congressional or judicial finding of forfeiture before a railroad
would lose its grant.22 Consequently, in 1906 and again in 1909 Congress
passed forfeiture statutes to essentially execute section 4 of the 1875 Act.22 9
House and Senate reports on the 1906 and 1909 forfeiture acts explain that the
forfeiture declared in the [1875] statute because of failure to build the road is
not self-executing. Either a Congressional or judicial forfeiture must be
declared.... This bill expresses an affirmative declaration of forfeiture against
all the old unused selection of rights of way where they are more than 5 years
old. The bill only deals with these old, abandoned, and unused filings, leaving
future Congresses to declare future forfeitures.230
The reports state that the filings "constitute a cloud upon the title,"23' and these
acts operate to execute the forfeitures and clear the title so subsequent grants
can be made without reference to railroad lines that have not been built.
There is no great significance to these two forfeiture acts which simply
effectuate the forfeiture provision of the 1875 Act. Moreover, they only operate
for forfeitures that have already occurred. Future forfeitures are to be
established by subsequent congressional or judicial determinations. Yet, the
Hash court viewed the language in these forfeiture provisions, that the removal
of the cloud of the railroad's claim would inure automatically to the benefit of
adjacent patentees, as indicating that in all railroad forfeitures or
abandonments the patentee had already received the government's interest and
the statute simply removed the cloud on the title. Of course, this makes no
sense in light of the legislative history of these provisions, for they were
designed to operate only when enacted, in 1906 and again in 1909, to determine
the past forfeitures and cause the government's interest to inure to the adjacent
patentees' benefit at that time.232 There is no reason to think that subsequent
forfeiture declarations would include the same language. It is important to
realize that the general forfeiture provision of the 1875 Act, codified at 43
U.S.C. § 937, is the substantive provision declaring forfeiture and terminating
227 Id.
228 See Scbulenberg v. Harriman, 88 U.S. 44, 63-64 (1874).
229 See Act of June 26, 1906, ch. 3550, 34 Stat. 482; Act of Feb. 25, 1909, ch. 191, 35 Stat. 647.
Congress also passed a forfeiture act in 1890. See GATES, supra note 11, at 457.
230 S. REP. No. 60-961, at 1 (1909); H.R. REP. No. 60-1885, at 1 (1909); H.R. REP. No. 59-2283, at
1 (1906); S. REP. No. 59-2732, at 1 (1906).
231 S. REP. No. 60-961, at 1; H.R. REP. No. 60-1885, at 1; H.R. REP. No. 59-2283, at 1; S. REP. No.
59-2732, at 1.
232 This timing issue is important. If the government's interest passed via patent, then legally
the forfeiture would automatically inure to the benefit of the patentee and we would not need a
statute effectuating that. But if the government's interest was retained and disposed via the
statutes at the time of forfeiture, then the language makes sense. In that regard, neither is a
quiet title statute because each grants the property rights in the land to the patentee at the time
of forfeiture or abandonment of the railroad grant.
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the railroad's interests after five years of nonconstruction. The 1906 and 1909
acts, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 940, are the congressional declarations necessary to
effectuate the substantive provision as well as the substantive grant of that
forfeited interest to the patentees. The fact that no forfeitures have been
declared by Congress since 1909 indicates that Congress has either not faced
any forfeitures or has chosen to deal with forfeitures differently.
Paul Gates discusses at length the Western animus toward railroad land
grants by the 1870s.2 Notably, those angry about the railroad checkerboard
grants, and not the right-of-way grants, were settlers and land speculators
who wanted the railroad land opened to settlement. Railroad lands that were
declared forfeited were then opened to settlement by people who had often
entered the land and made improvements as trespassers and who feared
ejectment by the railroads. But there was such widespread abuse of the
homestead and settlement laws throughout the end of the nineteenth
century, as epitomized by the invasion of the Indian reserves in eastern
Oklahoma,2 34 that the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
saw a series of laws designed to reign in the avaricious settlers while also
punishing the railroads for taking more land than they used.2 35 It took well
into the twentieth century, though, before the laws caught up with the
government's need to preserve some public lands. So it is not surprising that
the Supreme Court was flip-flopping on issues of railroad rights,
congressional land grant policy, and the interests of settlers.
Oddly enough, the 1906 and 1909 statutes speak of the railroad's
easements being forfeited at a time when the Supreme Court had
interpreted 1862-1871 FGROW grants to be limited fees following the 1903
decision in Townsend One could argue, therefore, that Congress did not
intend section 940 to apply to any 1862-1871 grants or 1875 Act grants
because they were all held to be defeasible fees. Between 1882 and 1902,
Congress passed numerous railroad grants over Indian lands, the majority
of which explicitly limited the railroad's rights to possessory use rights
that would cease upon discontinuation of railroad services which were
clearly interpreted to be easements.231 The language used in these Indian
land acts was some form of the following:
233 See GATES, supra note 11, at 454-61.
234 Id. at 464 (describing how 50,000 "sooners" ran across the border from Kansas in a mass
race to establish claims to homestead and other lands, many of whom had already staked out their
claims before the land was available).
235 See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 376, 24 Stat. 556 (authorizing the government to institute suits against
the railroads for return of lands erroneously conveyed to them); Act of July 10, 1886, ch. 764, 24 Stat. 143
(removing tax exempt status for railroads); Act of Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, 23 Stat 321 (punishing persons
who attempted to deter settlement by legitimate settlers); Act of May 14, 1880,. ch. 89, 21 Stat 140
(removing pretended claims from timber lands). See also GATES, supm note 11, at 477-85.
236 See Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490, 498 (1893). See also Act of Apr. 6, 1896, ch. 93, 29 Stat.
87; Act of Aug. 4, 1894, ch. 215, 28 Stat 229; Act of Feb. 24, 1896, ch. 29, 29 Stat. 12; Act of Mar. 2,
1887, ch. 319, 24 Stat. 446; Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat 888, 893-94; Act of Feb. 27, 1893, ch.
171, 27 Stat. 492; Act of Feb. 18, 1888, ch. 13, 25 Stat 39; Act of July 30, 1892, ch. 328, 27 Stat 336;
Act of July 1, 1886, ch. 601, 24 Stat. 117; Act of Mar. 23, 1898, ch. 87, 30 Stat 341; Act of Feb. 28,
1902, ch. 134, 32 Stat. 43; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 535, 26 Stat. 844; Act of Mar. 2, 1896, ch. 38, 29
Stat. 40; Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 453, 30 Stat. 1368; Act of Feb. 26, 1889, ch. 280, 25 Stat. 745; Act of
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No part of the lands herein authorized to be taken shall be leased or sold by the
company, and they shall not be used except in such manner and for such
purposes only as shall be necessary for the construction and convenient
operation of said railway, telegraph, and telephone lines; and when any portion
thereof shall cease to be so used such portion shall revert to the nation or tribe
of Indians from which the same shall have been taken. 237
Congress clearly knew how to limit the railroads to easements (i.e.
possessory use rights) in some of its grants, and it is quite reasonable to
conclude that Congress intended the forfeiture acts to apply only to these
more limited grants. Even if Congress intended the forfeiture acts to apply to
defeasible fee FGROW, undue emphasis should not be placed on the use of
the term "easement" within the acts because Congress was under great
pressure from settlers to restrict the railroad grants as much as possible.2"
The 1906 and 1909 forfeiture provisions should be contrasted with the
abandonment statute which Congress enacted in 1922-43 U.S.C. § 912. This
Act states that upon forfeiture or abandonment of FGROW, as declared by act
of Congress or judicial determination (the same requirement of congressional
or judicial determinations that was required for forfeitures), then
all right, title, interest, and estate of the United States in said lands shall, except
such part thereof as may be embraced in a public highway legally established
within one year after the date of said decree of forfeiture or abandonment be
transferred to and vested in any person... to whom or to which title of the
United States may have been or may be granted, conveying or purporting to
convey the whole of the legal subdivision or subdivisions traversed.., by such
railroad..., except lands within a municipality the title to which, upon forfeiture
or abandonment, as herein provided,, shall vest in such municipality .... 239
Besides this statute also requiring a congressional or judicial determination
of forfeiture or abandonment, it does not vest the government's interest in
the FGROW until one year after the abandonment when it is clear that no
public highway will be established on the corridor land. The 1922 Act, even
more clearly than the forfeiture act, envisions that the government's interest
will vest in adjacent patentees only after the abandonment and after no
municipal or highway use is declared.
Feb. 24, 1887, ch. 254, 24 Stat. 419; Act of Mar. 1, 1893, ch. 188, 27 Stat. 524; Act of Feb. 20, 1893, ch.
144, 27 Stat. 465; Act of June 21, 1890, ch. 479, 26 Stat. 170; Act of July 4, 1884, ch. 177, 23 Stat. 69;
Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 224, 27 Stat. 747; Act of May 14, 1888, ch. 248, 25 Stat. 140; Act of July 6,
1886, ch. 744, 24 Stat. 124; Act of Feb. 27, 1893, ch. 169, 27 Stat. 487; Act of Dec. 21, 1893, ch. 9, 28
Stat. 22; Act of Feb. 4, 1899, ch. 88, 30 Stat. 816; Act of Jan. 17, 1887, ch. 26, 24 Stat. 361; Act of Jan.
16, 1889, ch. 49, 25 Stat. 647; Act of Feb. 14 1898, ch. 17, 30 Stat. 241; Act of Jan. 29, 1897, ch. 106, 29
Stat. 502; Act of Mar. 30, 1898, ch. 104, 30 Stat. 347; Act of June 26, 1888, ch. 494, 25 Stat. 205; Act of
June 30, 1890, ch. 638, 26 Stat. 184; Act of July 26, 1888, ch. 718, 25 Stat. 350; Act of Mar. 18, 1896,
ch. 60, 29 Stat. 69; Act of Mar. 30, 1896, ch. 82, 29 Stat. 80; Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1248, 26 Stat. 632;
Act of July 4, 1884, ch. 179, 23 Stat. 73; Act of May 8, 1890, ch. 198, 26 Stat. 102; Act of Feb. 23, 1889,
ch. 201, 25 Stat. 684.
237 Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, 32 Stat. 43, 44.
238 See GATES, supra note 11, at 456-61.
239 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000).
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Legislative history behind this act confirms the view that it was passed
to conform to the new Supreme Court decisions holding that the railroads
received only qualified fees and not fee simple absolute in their FGROW and
that upon forfeiture or abandonment the "land reverts to and becomes the
property of the United States."24 E.C. Finney, Acting Secretary of the
Interior, wrote a letter in response to this proposed bill stating:
In making conveyances of the subdivisions traversed by such rights of way,
however, the United States issues patents for the full area of the tracts, no
diminution of acreage being made by reason of the prior grant of the right of
way. It follows as a result of the rulings above cited [ Townsend and Stringham]
that upon the abandonment by any railroad company of any right of way or any
portion of any right of way granted to it the legal title to the land included in
such fight of way reverts to and becomes the property of the United States and
does not pass to any patentee or patentees to whom patents were issued for the
full area of the subdivisions subject to the railroad company's prior -ight of use
and possession.
241
Hence, to get the land into the ownership of the patentees, section 912 was
necessary.
It is confounding that the Hash court calls section 912 a quiet title
enactment and gives section 940 such substantive weight,24 2 when in fact it
should be the other way around. Section 940 was called by its own creators a
bill to, on a single date, remove the clouds of title created by the railroad
maps, while section 912 was identified as giving to adjacent patentees the
rights in the FGROW that were excluded from their grants. It is unthinkable
that the Hash court did not even consult the legislative history of section
912, nor understand that it was clearly enacted in response to the Supreme
Court's redefinition of FGROW as limited fees in Townsend and Stringham.
And since the Court had clearly stated in Townsend that homestead
patentees did not receive any interest underlying the FGROW in their patent,
this Act served to give them those interests. Calling section 912 a quiet title
act, and not a bill giving substantive rights, clearly shows the court's
misunderstanding of the nature of these early railroad statutes. And
unfortunately, the court's failure to consider the application of section 912
violates clear congressional policy and undermines an important protection
of the public interest in these railroad grants.
240 H.R. REP. No. 67-217, at 2 (1921).
241 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). In contrast, some land grants allowed patentees to acquire
additional lands if their portion was diminished by a railroad right-of-way grant. See United
States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 110 F.2d 212, 216 (10th Cir. 1939); United States v. Drumb,
152 F.2d 821, 824 (10th Cir. 1946) (holding that under the Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat.
137, 142, adjacent landowners took -title to right-of-way upon abandonment, even though they
had been allotted other land to compensate for the diminution caused by the railroad grant).
The Drumb outcome, however, has been the subject of scholarly criticism. See W.F. SEMPLE,
OKLAHOMA INDIAN LAND TITLES ANNOTATED 266 (1952).
242 Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The court stated: "[S]ection
912 was of the nature of a 'quiet title' enactment." Id.
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VIII. ABANDONMENT PURSUANT TO 43 U.S.C. § 912.
The flip side of the homestead coin is the applicability of the 1922
railroad abandonment Act,243 43 U.S.C. § 912, to 1875 Act FGROW. If the
government's interests in 1875 Act corridors passed to homesteaders, then
section 912 is inapplicable because the property rights had passed out of the
government's hands before the railroad abandoned and the law became
operational. If, however, the government's retained interests in 1875 Act
lands did not pass to homesteaders, then they would be subject to disposal
pursuant to section 912, and subsequent amendments.2"
Three issues are important in analyzing this abandonment issue and the
applicability of section 912 to 1875 Act FGROW. The first is whether section
912 applies at all to 1875 Act FGROW to dispose of the government's
retained interest given its language and the differences between servient fee
and reverter rights. The overwhelming majority view held by the courts is
that section 912 is applicable to 1875 Act retained interests. By implication,
therefore, those interests did not pass to homesteaders. The second is the
timing of the transfer of property rights to adjacent landowners: at the time
of patent issuance, at the time of railroad abandonment, at the time of a
judicial or congressional determination of abandonment, or one year after
the judicial or congressional determination. If the interest passed at the time
of the patent, as the Hash court held, then subsequent legislative attempts to
amend section 912 to deal differently with these servient interests
constitutes a facial taking without just compensation.245 The third is whether
the criteria of section 912 were appropriately applied in this case.
Because most courts have held that patentees did not receive the
government's retained interest in FGROW, and as a result section 912 is
applicable, the Hash court's refusal to engage any of these cases is
particularly troubling. The Ninth Circuit, in Vieux v. East Bay Regional Park
Distriet,24 6 stated that section 912 "applies to grants both before and after
1871."247 The United States District Court for the District of Idaho, in Idaho v.
Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.,24 held that "§§ 912 and 316 apply to 1875
Act rights-of-way." 249 The Seventh Circuit stated that the "language of
§ 912... plainly refers to all Congressional grants of public lands for railroad
rights of way," in Mauler v. Bayfield County.25o The Tenth Circuit held that
sections 912 and 316 apply to 1875 Act rights-of-way, in Marshall v. Chicago
& Northwestern Transportation Co.2 5 '
243 Act of Mar. 8,1922, Pub. L No. 67-163,42 Stat. 414 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000)).
244 The most important amendment is the 1988 amendment to the NTSA that retained the federal
interests in FGROW rather than disposing of them to patentees. See National Trails System
Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100.470, § 3,102 Stat 2281 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) (2000)).
245 See discussion infra Part XI.
246 906 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1990).
247 Id at 1335.
248 617 F. Supp. 207 (D. Idaho 1985)
249 Id. at 213.
250 309 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2002).
251 31 F.3d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 1994).
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State courts have also concurred in the applicability of section 912 to
1875 Act FGROW.252 The Nebraska Supreme Court stated just two years
before the Hash decision that
[w]e are persuaded by the reasoning of the 9th and 10th Circuits,... and
likewise conclude that § 912 applies to rights-of-way created pursuant to the
1875 Act and that the import of § 912 is that the United States retained all
reversionary interests in such rights-of-way until the United States disposes of
those interests as provided by law.253
The decision in Hash undermines these precedents and sets up a conflict
among the circuits. 25 The only case that disagrees with the applicability of
section 912 to 1875 Act rights-of-way is City of Aberdeen v. Chicago &
Northwestern Transportation Co.,2  but, as noted above, that case is clearly
the anomaly.256 Because it held that the patentees did receive the servient
fee interest in their patents, it was logically necessary to hold that section
912 was inapplicable. Although not directly overruled, however, the Tenth
Circuit disagreed with the holding in Aberdeen in 1994 in, Marshall v.
Cticago & Northwestern Transportation Co.257
Numerous courts have also stated that failure to apply section 912 to
1875 Act interests would nullify and render futile the act itself. As the
Seventh Circuit explained in Mauler, "[c]learly Congress assumed the United
States possessed a reversionary interest in railroad rights of way, else it
would make little sense for Congress to have passed laws like §§ 912, 913,
and 1248(c) to dispose of land the federal government did not own."2 51 In
Idaho v. Oregon Shortline Railroad Co. (Idaho ]),259 the court stated that
252 See, e.g., Barney v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 726, 731 (S.D. 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, Brown v. N. Hills Reg'l R.R. Auth., 732 N.W.2d 732 (S.D. 2007) (stating that "[w]e
conclude that the United States Government retained a reversionary interest in railroad rights-of-
way, including those granted post 1871 and that § 912 applies to the right-of-way granted to the
Railroad"). See also Marlow v. Malone, 734 N.E.2d 195, 201 (l. App. Ct. 2000); City of Maroa v. Ill.
Cent. R.R., 592 N.E.2d 660,667 (111. App. Ct. 1992); Hamilton v. King County, No. 44699-1-I, 2000 WL
1772525, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2000) (holding that section 912 would apply once the
railroad was deemed to have abandoned its right-of-way).
253 Whipps Land & Cattle Co. v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, 658 N.W.2d 258, 267 (Neb. 2003).
See also Keife v. Logan, 75 P.3d 357, 358 (Nev. 2003) (applying section 912 to an 1862 FGROW).
254 Because Vieux held that section 912 was applicable to 1875 Act corridors, and because
Idaho is in the Ninth Circuit, there arises a possibility of an untenable conflict were this court to
rule contrary to Vieux Vieux v. E. Bay Reg'l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). A real
property defendant, who must conform to the legal standards set out in the circuit governing its
territory, cannot be held to conform to different legal standards. Either section 912 is applicable to
1875 Act lands in the Ninth Circuit, or it is not. A decision out of the Federal Circuit on a
specialized matter under the Tucker Act could potentially create such a conflict. Although this
conflict of laws issue was not directly before the court in Hash, it offers an additional reason why
the decision is problematic in contradicting precedents in the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits-
the only circuits to rule on the applicability of section 912 to 1875 Act lands.
255 602 F. Supp. 589, 591-92 (D.S.D. 1984).
256 See supra note 207-09 and accompanying text (discussing Aberdeen).
257 31 F.3d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 1994).
258 Mauler v. Bayfield County, 309 F.3d 997, 1002 (7th Cir. 2002).
259 617 F. Supp. 207 (D. Idaho 1985).
[Vol. 38:711
HeinOnline  -- 38 Envtl. L. 752 2008
THE THREAT TO RAIL- TRAIL CONVERSIONS
[tihis Court has the obligation to interpret § 912 (and §§ 913 and 316) in such a
way to fully effectuate congressional intent: These statutes would be rendered
null if this Court were to find them inapplicable to 1875 Act rights-of-way, for
they were specifically enacted to dispose of the United States' retained interest
in 1875 Act rights-of-way.
26°
Legislative history also exists to support Congress's intention that section
912 applies to 1875 Act corridors. 261
The second important issue to consider in determining abandonment is
the timing of the shift in property rights. The Hash decision raises profound
questions about the timing of the property transfers and thus raises potential
takings liability. If the homestead patent was granted after the railroad
received the FGROW, then the government's interest in the underlying fee
either transferred at the time of the patent or was retained to be disposed of
when the railroad terminates the FGROW through abandonment. Section
912 clearly envisions that the government's retained interest does not
transfer until at least one year after a formal declaration of abandonment
and only then would the land office make a formal transfer of its property in
the FGROW.262 This delay insures that other public uses can be made of
these corridors. The Hash decision completely undermines this public
character of section 912 and forecloses Congress's ability to amend
section 912 to dispose of its interests differently.
Abandonment of a federally granted right-of-way entails a three-step
process of: 1) obtaining STB abandonment authorization; 2) consummating
that abandonment by submission of a letter of consummation pursuant to 49
C.F.R. § 1152.29(e)(2); 263 and then 3) disposing of the property rights as
260 Id. at 212.
261 See H.R. REP. No. 59-2283, at 1 (1906); H.R. REP. No. 66-843, at 1-2 (1920). See also Barney v.
Burlington N. R.R. Co., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 726, 731 (S.D. 1992), rev'd on othergrounds, Brown v. N.
Hills Reg'l R.R. Auth., 732 N.W.2d 732 (S.D. 2007) ("To say that § 912 does not apply to the
easements granted under the 1875 Act would, in effect, nullify the intent of Congress.... [Tihe
Congressional Record which accompanied the enactment of § 912 shows Congress's intent to
preserve railroad corridors for 'public highway' use.").
262 See 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000); See also King County v. Burlington N. R.R. Corp., 885 F. Supp.
1419, 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding a decision by the Washington Supreme Court involving a
section of right-of-way did not constitute a formal declaration of abandonment for purposes of
commencing the one-year period during which the county could embrace the right-of-way as a
public highway).
263 Until 1984, railroads were required to notify the ICC that they had consummated their
abandonment of lines by submission of a letter or statement confirming the abandonment.
Because of the confusion that occurred when abandonment authorization was granted but the
actions of the railroads regarding consummation were unclear, the STB issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking to require a notice of consummation. Abandonment and Discontinuance
of Rail Lines and Rail Transportation Under 49 U.S.C. 10903, 61 Fed. Reg. 11,174, 11,178
(proposed Mar. 19, 1996) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(e)(2) (2007)). See also Birt v. STB, 90
F.3d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that when considering whether a railroad has consummated
abandonment, the court must look to the carrier's intent); CONRAIL v. STB, 93 F.3d 793 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (prior to the consummation notification requirements going into effect, the CONRAIL.
court rejected respondent's suggestion that the railway's failure to notify the Conruission that
the line had been abandoned was evidence of petitioner's uncertainty of purpose).
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determined by section 912. Section 912 provides that federal rights-of-way will
be deemed abandoned only by virtue of a judgment by a court of competent
jurisdiction or an act of Congress, and STB abandonment does not meet this
criteria, thus necessitating the multi-step process.264 As noted above, the
federal courts have determined that section 912 controls disposition of all
FGROW.2 65 Under this statute any federally granted parcel continues to exist,
usable as a railroad 'or other public highway, until Congress adopts a statute
transferring the title2 66 or a judicial declaration of abandonment is made.2 67
Most notably, an agency determination of abandonment authorization (in the
event of public necessity and convenience) does not constitute a judgment by
a court of competent jurisdiction; the federal district courts have held that
only a decision of a federal court meets the criteria of section 912.214
Once abandonment has been declared along a federally granted right-of-
way, the land will automatically transfer to any municipality through which
the line rms.269 The land may be transferred for public highway use to a state
department of transportation or similar state agency within a year pursuant to
43 U.S.C. § 913 or, prior to 1988, it would then be granted to the patentees of
the subdivision traversed by the corridor if no public highway or municipal
use was made. What is important about the timing issue is that if the
government's servient fee interest does not transfer until at least one year
after abandonment, then there are no vested rights under section 912 in
adjacent landowners and Congress can amend section912 to retain its
servient fee interest for railbankdng. This is what it believed it was doing in
1988 by the amendments to the NTSA_27 And if there are no vested rights in
patentees, then Congress's decision to retain its servient fee interests does not
raise potential taldngs issues.271
It is a well-accepted rule of construction that statutes should be
interpreted to further the public policy that motivated their enactment, not
264 Phillips Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 97 F.3d 1375, 1377 (10th Cir. 1996);
Barney v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., Inc., 490 N.W.2d at 730-31.
265 Vieux v. E. Bay Reg'l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); King County v.
Burlington N. R.R. Corp., 885 F. Supp. at 1422; Marshall v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 826 F. Supp.
1310, 1312 (D. Wyo. 1992), atfd, 31 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 1994); Barney v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,
Inc., 490 N.W.2d at 730-31; Mauler v. Bayfield County, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170 (W.D. Wis.
2001), affd, 309 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2002); City of Maroa v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 592 N.E.2d 660, 666 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992). But see City of Aberdeen v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 602 F. Supp. 589, 591-92
(D.S.D. 1984) (holding that section 912 was not applicable to 1875 Act rights-of-way).
266 See, e.g., Brown v. Washington, 924 P.2d 908, 916-17 (Wash. 1996) (noting Congress
adopted a statute authorizing transfer of title to the state of Washington).
267 Phillips Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 97 F.3d at 1377; see also Idaho v. Or.
Short Line R.R. Co. (Idaho Lo), 617 F. Supp. 213, 216-18 (D. Idaho 1985).
268 Phillips Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 97 F.3d at 1377.
269 See43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000).
270 National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1248 (2000); see S. REP. No. 100-408, .at 3 (1988),
repnInted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2607, 2607-08; see also King County v. Burlington N. R.R. Corp.,
885 F. Supp. at 1422-23 (applying section 912 to FGROW and finding that a trail qualifies as a
public highway" under Washington law).
271 Courts should always avoid the interpretation that creates a constitutional violation. See
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(discussing interpretive justiciability limits).
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so as to frustrate that policy.27 2 The entire history of the railroad land grants,
as explained in Townsend, Strngham, Great Northern, and Union Paciic,
uniformly support the high public policy of encouraging and protecting
railroad corridors and public highways. In Townsend, the Supreme Court
noted that federal railroad grants are to be interpreted "subject to the
condition that their rules do not impair the efficacy of the grants," and that
"[t]he substantial consideration inducing the grant was the perjetual use of
the land for the legitimate purposes of the railroad."2 73 Another court stated
that "[flederal legislation governing the disposition of the government's
reversionary interest evinces 'an intent to ensure that railroad rights-of-way
would continue to be used for public transportation purposes, primarily for
highway transportation.'"2 4 As one piece of legislative history notes:
Recognizing the public interest in establishment of roads, your committee
safeguarded such rights by suggesting the amendments above referred to
protecting not only roads now established but giving the public authorities one
year's time after a decree of forfeiture or abandonment to establish a public
highway upon any part of such right of way.275
There can be no question that protecting railroad corridors from
fractionation and disintegration upon abandonment was the prime motive
behind the passage of section 912. Congress wanted to protect these
expensive corridor assets by allowing for conversion to highway use, or
allowing preexisting highway uses, 276 and yet have the least amount of
disruption when abandonment occurred. The importance of the public policy
of protecting rail corridors motivated Congress into requiring that vesting in
subdivision owners would occur only upon a determination of abandonment
by a court of competent jurisdiction or act of Congress. The destruction of
these corridors, therefore, was not to occur simply by non-use, or even upon
the elements of common-law abandonment. Nor would they occur by a simple
ICC/STB authorization of abandonment. No interests would vest in private
parties except upon a court determination or act of Congress.277 It is hard to
imagine a more persuasive statement of the congressional intent of preserving
these rail corridors than requiring an act of Congress for their destruction.
Furthermore, the railbanking statute functions as a legal process for a
railroad to preserve, rather than abandon, its property rights. The statute
272 Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 126 S. Ct. 1252, 1257 (2006) (holding that courts should look to
the purposes behind the legislation); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948) (stating
that "every reasonable presumption attaches" to legislation "to make it effective in accord with
the evident purpose").
273 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1903).
274 Hamilton v. King County, Wash., No. 44699-1-I, 2000 WL 1772525, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 4, 2000) (quoting Idaho 1, 617 F. Supp. 207, 212 (D. Idaho 1985)).
275 S. REP. No. 67-388, at 2 (1922).
276 That is the purpose of 43 U.S.C. § 913 (2000) and 23 U.S.C. § 316 (2000), which sought to
reverse a contrary Ninth Circuit holding in HA. & L.D. Holland Co. v. N Pac. Ry. Co., 214 F. 920,
928 (9th Cir. 1914).
277 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000).
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explicitly provides that railbanking and interim trail use "shall not be
treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use
of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes."2 78 Because the railroads retain a
future interest to reenter and reactivate, the railroads' property rights, as
stated in the statute, do not terminate. Thus, railbanking is a de jure
declaration that abandonment has not occurred. Railbanking, quite simply, is
a process to "not abandon."
Typically, state-law property rights do not become possessory until the
railroad has abandoned its line and some entity interferes with the
repossession by the landowner. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in
Preseault v. ICC, stated that ICC continuing jurisdiction over abandonment
cannot always be the equivalent to, and preempt issues of, the landowner's
constitutional rights under the takings clause. 279 Thus, questions of
abandonment and takings liability must be disaggregated. Takings liability
may still exist even if a railroad has not abandoned. And takings liability may
exist after abandonment if an entity interferes with the landowner's property
rights. But there is no question that a railroad that railbanks its corridor has
not abandoned it. The government may still be. liable for interference with
state-law property rights, as the Federal Circuit held on remand in Preseault v.
United States,2"' and be obligated to pay compensation. But the compensation
is due precisely because the abandonment that would trigger state-law
property rights was forestalled by application of the railbanking statute.
The critical question in this case, therefore, is whether the federal
property rights can be taken, such that compensation is due, when Congress
amends its statutes to provide a mechanism for a railroad to not abandon,
but to retain its federally-based property rights intact. The answer to that
question has to do with whether or not the patentees' rights in the servient
fee are vested such that railbanking and continued federal jurisdiction over
the rail corridor interferes to such an extent with those vested rights that
constitutional property rights are unduly interfered with.2"' Interference with
those property rights, however, is not tied to the actual process of
abandonment by the railroad.
278 National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000).
279 494 U.S. 1, 24 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated:
The scope of the Commission's authority to regulate abandonments, thereby delimiting
the ambit of federal power, is an issue quite distinct from whether the Commission's
exercise of power over matters within its jurisdiction effected a taking of petitioners'
property.... Although the Conmmission's actions may pre-empt the operation and effect
of certain state laws, those actions do not displace state law as the traditional source of
the real property interests.... The Commission's actions may delay property owners'
enjoyment of their reversionary interests, but that delay burdens and defeats the
property interest rather than suspends or defers the vesting of those property rights....
Any other conclusion would convert the ICC's power to pre-empt conflicting state
regulation of interstate commerce into the power to pre-empt the rights guaranteed by
state property law, a result incompatible with the Fifth Amendment.
Id (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
280 100 F.3d 1525, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
281 See discussion infra Part IX.
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Nevertheless, for federally granted property rights, as exist in these
FGROWs, Congress could provide that no rights vest in adjacent patentees
until the FGROW is abandoned by the railroad, and if so Congress could
certainly alter the terms and conditions of abandonment at any time without
implicating the takings clause so long as the patentees' rights have not
vested." 2 This is precisely what Congress believed it was doing when it
adopted section 912 and section 1248(c), which provided that landowner
rights would not shift until a judicial or congressional declaration of
abandonment.2 3 And this is why the timing of the shift in property rights
matters. Hence, for FGROW subject to section 912, adjacent landowners'
property rights in the servient fee do not transfer out of the government until
one year after abandonment when it is determined that no public highway
use will be made of the corridor. If the property rights transfer any earlier,
then the public highway use, the municipality use, the interim trail use, or
any other public use could all raise takings implications.
Any other interpretation of the applicability of section 912 would render
the application of section 912 in Vieu., Marlow, Bamey, Marshal, Wthipps,
and Idaho I to have been unconstitutional takings.2 4 As we can see,
however, the Hash court's summary finding of abandonment, without
discussing the criteria of section 912 or making findings of abandonment
that would justify its decision as a judicial determination of abandonment,
resulted in essentially nullifying section 912, and ruling that the adjacent
landowners were entitled to compensation.28 5 This ruling means that
Congress could not amend section 912 to retain rather than dispose of its
rights without running afoul of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
By its holding, the Hash court essentially ruled that 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) was a
facial taking because it purported to retain and reuse property rights that
had already been transferred out of federal ownership.8 ' Given the fact that
the Supreme Court has yet to find that any law works a facial taking, this
court's decision without any discussion, briefing, argument, or findings is
particularly stunning.2"7 To the extent the Hash court found that section 912
282 In general, property owners do not have a vested right in a particular statutory scheme,
even a statutory scheme that defines state property rights. Thus, modification of those statutory
schemes in ways that extinguish unvested or contingent property rights are not deemed
unconstitutional because the rights are not deemed "property." "[Tihe rule is well settled that
the legislature may modify [possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry] for the betterment of
judicial procedure and the unfettering of estates, so as to bring them into the market for sale,
unless such retroactive laws impair rights which are vested." Wayne F. Foster, Annotation,
Validity of Statute Canceling, Destroying, Nullifying, or Limiting Enforcement of Possibiities of
Reverter or Rights of Re-Entry for Condition Broken, 87 A.L.R. 3D 1011, 1014 (1978).
283 43 U.S.C. § 912 (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) (2000).
284 It is a common rule of statutory construction, however, that courts should not interpret
statutes so as to create a constitutional violation if another reasonable interpretation would
avoid such a conflict. See, eg, Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
285 Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
286 Id.
287 The Supreme Court has yet to find any statute works a facial taking, and has indeed noted
that facial challenges are "uphill battles." See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,
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is not applicable to 1875 Act corridors, it eviscerated not only section 912,
but 43 U.S.C. § 913, 23 U.S.C. § 316, and 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) 218 in the majority
of FGROW cases, namely those involving 1875 Act FGROW.
IX. SCOPE OF THE FGROW EASEMENT
Any sound interpretation of the interplay of the pre-1871 and 1875 Act
railroad grants, the Homestead Act, section 912, and subsequent
legislation, however, must begin from the position that the goal of the
railroad grants was to provide a system of public transportation and
communications that was recognized as being of the highest public
priority. And a final important issue is whether the scope of the 1875 Act
federal railroad easement is sufficiently robust to permit railbanking and
trail use without running afoul of the takings clause. As noted above, some
states have held that railroad easements can be converted to trail uses
without violating the scope of the easement. Others have held that trail use
is beyond the scope and thus converting the corridor to a trail requires
compensation. Although no court has yet ruled on the scope of these 1875
Act easements, the language of the grants and the purpose behind the
grants support the conclusion that railbanking and trail use fit well within
the parameters of the easement and that consequently no takings liability
arises when trail use is made.
In support of an enlarged understanding of the scope of these
easements is their similarity to fee interests. Numerous courts have
rejected the stark distinction between the limited fee of Townsend and the
easement of Great Northern, holding instead that the railroad easement is
closer to a fee simple than to the common-law private easements with
which it is often confused. The Supreme Court explained that a railroad
easement is substantially different from a common-law easement, so
different that it looks like a fee simple, when it stated that a railroad
easement is "more than an ordinary easement" and has the "attributes of
the fee, perpetuity and exclusive use and possession; also the remedies of
the fee, and, like it, corporeal, not incorporeal property."28 9 The District
Court of Idaho also explained:
737 (1997). There have been a few successful facial takings cases in state and district courts. See,
e.g, Richardson v. Honolulu, 759 F. Supp. 1477, 1497 (D. Haw. 1991); Borman v. Kossuth County,
584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1177 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). Given the Court's curtailing of its runaway takings jurisprudence, it is highly unlikely
that it will find any statute to work a facial taking in the near future.
288 These statutes, and others, were periodically enacted to manage these retained interests
in railroad rights-of-way, first by encouraging their conversion to other public transportation
uses, and then through retaining those interests and making them available for railbanking.
289 New Mexico v. U.S. Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 183 (1898). In a subsequent case, the Supreme
Court noted, "[a] railroad right-of-way is a very substantial thing. It is more than a mere right of
passage. It is more than an easement." W. Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 540, 570
(1904). Most courts have not distinguished between limited fee interests and easements under
these federal railroad grants because the exclusive rights of the railroads in both comport with
corporeal property rights and remedies.
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[U]nder traditional rules, a simple easement carries with it no right to exclusive
use and occupancy of the land. Even if the 1875 Act granted only an easement, as
opposed to a higher right-of-way interest, Congress had authority, by virtue of its
broad power over interstate commerce, to grant such easements subject to its
own terms and conditions - which were to preserve a corridor of public
transportation, particularly the railroad transportation, in order to facilitate the
development of the "Western vastness." Congress could pre-empt or override
common-law rules regarding easements, reversions, or other traditional real
property interests. In other words, even if the 1875 Act granted only an easement,
it does not necessarily follow that Congress would or did not intend to retain an
interest in that easement. This is consistent with another well-settled rule of
statutory construction which provides that conveyances by the Government will
be strictly interpreted against the grantee and in favor of the grantor.
290
Many courts are grappling with the fact that the railroad easement is, in
essence, a new estate in land that looks like a defeasible fee without mineral
rights. Even though individual private parties may not create new estates, the
federal government can. Just as the limited fee and the easement are not typical
common-law real property interests, the government's retained interest is not a
typical possibility of reverter or servient fee. As the court in Idaho Iexplained:
Congress clearly felt that it had some retained interest in railroad rights-of-way.
The precise nature of that retained interest need not be shoe-homed into any
specific category cognizable under the rules of real property
law.... [C]ongressional committeemen in the early 1920's spoke of this
retained interest in terms of an "implied condition of reverter." Regardless of
the precise nature of this interest, Congress clearly believed that it had
authority over 1875 Act railroad rights-of-way. [Section 912] evince[s] an intent
to ensure that railroad rights-of-way would continue to be used for public
transportation purposes, primarily for highway transportation.
291
The renaming of the right-of-way in Great Northern, from a limited fee
to an easement, concerns the balance of rights as between the federal
government and the grantee railroad and should not indicate that the scope
of activities that can be undertaken on the railroad's easement are
dramatically less than could be undertaken on a limited fee.
Even if one were to adopt common law property rules that easements
are mere servitudes on an underlying fee, while defeasible fee interests are
corporeal hereditaments, any interpretation of the nature of the federally-
granted rights-of-way must take into account the purpose of the grants.
These right-of-way grants were not made simply to create a railroad, but
were to create public transportation and communications arteries. The
typical federal railroad grant would be titled: "An Act to aid in the
construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri River to the
Pacific Ocean, and to secure to the Government the use of the same for
290 Idaho I, 617 F. Supp. 207, 212 (D. Idaho 1985) (citing Union Pacific and Great Northern).
291 Id. Accord Marshall v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 31 F.3d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 1994)
(following the Idaho Idecision).
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Postal, Military, and other purposes."292 Even if the 1875 Act did not carry
the same title, the grants of these federal rights-of-way did carry with them
the obligation to allow the placement of telegraph lines, use for parcel post,
and required free or reduced rates for military transportation.29 3 To imagine
that the land granted to the railroads under the 1875 Act are mere railroad
easements that terminate upon the cessation of rail use assumes that the
federal government has no other interest in these corridors than providing
subsidies for the railroads. Clearly, that is not the case. Regardless of what
we call this "railroad easement," it must contain within it the entire array of
transportation and communications uses.
Besides the integrated national defense and transportation policies
behind the federal railroad grants, there must be implicit within them a
retained interest in the government sufficient to protect these overall national
policies. Thus, when the court in Rice stated that the "agency issuing the
patent had neither the actual nor the apparent authority to convey the interest
of the United States under the right of way, then, of course, the deed, although
it purported so to do, did not convey that interest,"294 it could only have meant
that that retained interest was of such a quality that it could not be conveyed
out of the government's possession because there were other important
governmental purposes protected by the grant.
One of the most common challenges by opponents to rail-trail
conversions is that trail use exceeds the scope of a railroad grant and,
therefore, when a corridor is railbanked and interim trail use is made of the
land pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), the federal government has taken the
reversionary or underlying fee interest from the adjacent landowner and
owes compensation. When the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of section 1247(d), it held that whether or not the statute worked a taking
was to be determined in individual cases through a Tucker Act claim.295
After a number of decisions looking at the state-law property rights and the
interplay of federal ICC jurisdiction,296 the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit eventually held that compensation was due in that particular case
because the state-law railroad easements had terminated prior to the
corridor's railbanking, and that the possession of the corridor land had
returned to the landowner.29 7 Subsequent takings cases have found that
whether compensation is due or not depends on whether the state law
property rights have been unduly interfered with by the federal railbanking
statute. Not surprisingly, in states in which the easement is robust and
292 Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 216, 13 Stat. 365.
293 General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482 (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (2000)).
294 Rice v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 254, 256-57 (D.N.D. 1972).
295 Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990).
296 See generally, Preseault v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 818 (Cl. Ct. 1992); Preseault v. United
States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (Fed. Cl. 1992).
297 See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996). This case can be
easily distinguished from typical railbanldng takings cases in that the state-law rights were held
to have been terminated before the removal of federal ICC jurisdiction and railbanking, and not
as a result of the railbanidng, an outcome that is logically unsound and very odd.
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general, no compensation has been found due;298 and in states in which the
easement is deemed to be narrowly drawn and specific to railroad use only,
compensation has been ordered.299
Hash is the first case to specifically address the compensation
obligation with regard to FGROW, and not to state-law created railroad
easements. But using the reasoning of the Preseault line of cases and the
state-law cases, it should be clear that no taking has occurred when the
federal government passes a law holding intact easements that were granted
for multiple transportation and communication purposes when the railroad
use ceases but other public uses continue. There are numerous reasons for
this conclusion.
First, FGROW are creatures of federal law and not state law and
therefore we look to federal actions to determine the scope of the rights
conveyed. Because these rights-of-way had multiple uses and served
important postal and military needs, the scope must been deemed broader
and infused with a greater public purpose than merely a grant to aid a
railroad corporation. Also, because FGROW are creatures of federal law,
federal laws can alter the property rights without running afoul of the
constitutional protections on property so long as the rights are not vested,
because no one has a vested right to a particular statutory scheme. Similarly,
congressional actions, as in the passing of section 912, are relevant in
interpreting the scope of federally granted property rights. The fact that
Congress believed the government retained an interest in these FGROW that
survived homestead patents is a good indication that Congress meant to
dispose of the federal interest only after abandonment.
Furthermore, what the railbanking statute does is provide for a
different disposition of federal interests in FGROW before the railroad
abandons, because abandonment is the act that causes the vesting of
landowner rights in corridor land. By amending section 912 through 16
U.S.C. § 1248(c), Congress chose to retain property that in the past it had
chosen to give away because giving it away frustrated an important public
purpose (preserving intact rail corridors), and it chose to retain only those
properties that had not yet vested in landowners through abandonment.
Thus, when the Hash court ordered compensation on the grounds that
the railbanked corridor had been abandoned, it doubly erred. It erred by
ignoring the issue of abandonment which is the heart of the railbanking
statute. To the extent section 1247(d) holds that railbanking is not
abandonment, then how can a railbanked federal right-of-way be deemed
abandoned? Such a finding shows that the court does not understand the
interplay of abandonment and railbanking. Then when it further ordered
compensation because the corridor is abandoned, it compounded its error.
298 See, e.g, Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 37 Fed. C1. 545 (Fed. C1. 1997).
299 See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 52 Fed. C1. 667 (Fed. C1. 2002); Swisher v. United
States, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Kan. 2003); Town of Grantwood Vil. v. United States, 55 Fed.
C1. 481 (Fed. C1. 2003); Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. C1. 771 (Fed. C1. 2000); Hubbert v.
United States, 62 Fed. C1. 73 (Fed. C1. 2004); Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Moore v. United States, 63 Fed. C1. 781 (Fed. C1. 2005).
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Because even if the corridor were abandoned (and not railbanked), it is
entirely wrong to view the federal rights as so limited to railroad uses only
that they could not accommodate shifting technologies and other public
purposes. If the federal government gives to a railroad company a right-of-
way for multiple public purposes, and then it determines that too many
corridors are being destroyed which should instead be preserved, and thus it
passes a law to preserve them, it makes no sense whatsoever to require the
government pay again through compensation to landowners whose rights in
the corridor land had not yet vested.
X. H4SHPROGENY
Unfortunately, the poor reasoning and the very lax final order of the
Hash decision is beginning to wreak havoc among other courts. First, the
district court on remand in Hash examined the final paragraph of the
Federal Circuit decision, and read it as a mandate that abandonment had
occurred and that railbanking constituted a taking for which just
compensation was due.3 0 The final paragraph read:
On the railway's abandonment of its right-of-way these owners were
disencumbered of the railway easement, and upon conversion of this land to a
public trail, these owners' property interests were taken for public use, in
accordance with the principles set forth in the Preseault cases. On remand the
district court shall determine just compensation on the conditions that apply to
these landowners. 3° 1
For Judge Williams, the most persuasive evidence that the Federal Circuit
had determined both the abandonment and takings liability issues (even
though neither were briefed nor argued before the Federal Circuit and the
parties believed they were only appealing the issue of the retained interest)
was the fact that the Federal Circuit refused to rehear the case on the
government's petition for rehearing.302 Had it accepted the petition to rehear
the case it could have spoken to the abandonment and liability issues. But it
did not. Consequently, Judge Williams accepted that the railroad had
abandoned the corridor (despite it having been railbanked) and that
compensation was due.
3 3
To some extent this outcome is merely the consequence of a wrong
decision on appeal. Judge Williams had little option, given the language of
the last paragraph, but to accept the landowners' claims that the Federal
Circuit had made a final decision on abandonment and takings liability. Were
the language in the future tense, instead of the past tense, the outcome might
have been quite different. However, the effects of this somewhat haphazard
300 Hash v. United States, No. CV-99-324-S-MHW, 2007 WL 1309548, at *1, *6 (D. Idaho Feb. 1,
2007).
301 Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
302 Hash v. United States, 2007 WL 1309548, at *5-6.
303 Id
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final paragraph are not limited to the remand in Hash, but have extended to
another case involving a different landowner on the same railroad corridor
as in Hash. In that case, Blendu v. United States,4 Judge Hewitt found that
the Federal Circuit decision in Hash precluded his court's consideration of
the merits of the case-namely whether the railroad had abandoned and
whether takings liability accrued.30 5 Thus, the court granted summary
judgment for the landowners and moved directly to assessing takings
damages.306 Both Judge Williams and Judge Hewitt were uncomfortable with
the idea that the issues of abandonment and liability were determined once
and for all by the Federal Circuit without briefing or argument on the issues,
but both felt bound to follow the Federal Circuit's rather offhand order.
Not surprisingly, the impact of the Hash finding has now moved beyond
the narrow scope of the trail at issue in that case, to a trail in Colorado. In
Ellamae Phiips Co. v. United States,307 Judge Baskir very reluctantly felt
bound to follow the Hash mandate on abandonment and liability for 1875
Act FGROW, but did not do so without criticism. As Judge Baskir noted:
The absence of any predicate to the Federal Circuit's conclusory statement
regarding abandonment is troublesome both for the litigants in Hash and for
courts attempting to apply correctly precedent in other 1875 Act conversions.
The Government thoroughly briefed its non sequitur arguments to the Federal
Circuit in its petition for rehearing in Hash f. The petition was denied .... It is
not for a trial court to disregard appellate decisions we think wrongly decided
or poorly reasoned
308
With the extension of the Hash mandate to other 1875 Act trail conversions,
the courts risk seriously undermining the entire railbanking program and
certainly neglect numerous congressional statements that preservation of
rail corridors through railbanking is a high national priority and does not
constitute abandonment. Judge Baskir, at least, could have resisted the
finding of abandonment by requiring that the landowners in Ellamae Phillips
comply with the terms of section 912. It would be counterintuitive that a
federal statute requiring an act of Congress or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction is satisfied when abandonment is declared by the
Federal Circuit in a different case, for a different corridor, and without
argument or briefing by the parties.
Further reverberations have occurred in the state courts. The Supreme
Court of South Dakota has now overruled its prior decision in Barney v.
Burlington Northern Railroad Co., Inc.309 Following the Hash finding that no
reversionary interests remain in the government for 1875 Act FGROW lands,
the South Dakota court in Brown v. Northern Hills Regional Railroad
304 75 Fed. Cl. 543 (Fed. C1. 2007).
305 Id. at 549.
306 Id.
307 77 Fed. C1. 387 (Fed. C1. 2007)
308 Id at 395 (emphasis added).
309 490 N.W.2d 726 (S.D. 1992).
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Authoity1 held that section 912 did not apply to an FGROW and it
therefore quieted title to an abandoned corridor in the adjacent landowner.
Again, the court was uncomfortable with this finding. After nostalgically
reciting at great length the rationale for its decision in Barney, especially the
role of numerous federal statutes (sections 912, 913, 1247(d) and 1248(c))
and the legislative history behind these acts, the South Dakota court simply
stated that without a reservation in the patents for the servient fee
underlying the FGROW, the federal government retained no interest once it
issued the patent.3 ' It is quite clear from the opinion that the court felt Hash
is problematic-the lengthy and affirmative discussion of the rationale
behind the Barney decision is contrasted to the very brief and circumspect
rationale behind Hash that called for Bameys reversal.3"2
The only small comfort that can be taken from the Hash decision is that
so far it only applies in the case of one type of FGROW-those corridors
granted pursuant to the 1875 Act. This was made clear in Home on the Range
v. AT&T Corp.3 13 In that case, the District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana held that the government did retain substantial interests in 1862-1871
FGROWs that would allow for placement of fiber optic cables on those
corridors, while finding that Hash governed only on the issue of 1875 Act
FGROWs 14 The court relied heavily on the Townsend decision and a Seventh
Circuit decision315 that found homestead patentees did not receive the
government's interest in those pre-1875 defeasible fee FGROWs. 316 Thus, the
court tried to make it clear that the corridor preservation objectives of
section 912 remain intact in the case of other federal grants. But until Hash is
properly clarified, either by the Federal Circuit itself or a higher court, and the
issues of abandonment and subsequent use of these corridors is actually
decided through considered legal analysis instead of in an offhand remark, the
case may continue to be applied by the courts in a manner that will undermine
Congress's clear intention that, upon abandonment, these corridors be made
available for continued and future public transportation use.
XI. CAN HASH BE LIMITED?
Until it is corrected by a higher court, we are left with the odd situation
that the government has no retained interest underlying 1875 Act FGROWs
and a conflict in the circuits with respect to the applicability of both
section 912 and 16 U.S.C. § 1248(c) to 1875 Act FGROW. But there is one way
to protect the federal interest in these corridors while still respecting the Hash
decision-if the courts ultimately find that, even if the government's
underlying fee interest transferred to homesteaders, section 912 still applies to
310 732 N.W.2d 732 (S.D. 2007).
311 Id at 738-40.
312 Id. at 738-39.
313 386 F. Supp. 2d 999 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
314 Id. at 1017-24.
315 Mauler v. Bayfield County, 309 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2002).
316 Home on the Range v. AT&T Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1004-07.
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the federal government's retained property right; not in the underlying fee, but
in the FGROW itself. Because FGROWs were conveyed out of the public lands
for transportation and telecommunications needs, and because the
government has a clear priority interest in promoting and maintaining national
transportation infrastructure, it is quite logical to recognize a federal interest,
perhaps a kind of reversionary interest, in the FGROW itself. Under this
rationale, the government can authorize the shift in use from railroad to
highway or to municipal use under section 912, consistent with a recognition
that the adjacent landowner will receive unencumbered use of the full fee only
when all other public uses of the FGROW have been considered and found
unnecessary. This result follows from the stringent requirement that FGROWs
are not to be deemed abandoned without an act of Congress or judicial
decision looking at the public necessity for these valuable corridors. Once no
further public use is to be made, then the FGROW easement will terminate
and no further action need be taken. The adjacent landowners can then
reacquire full possession of their servient fee.
This is the only logical way to harmonize the abandonment statutes and
the trails act amendments with the lengthy case law applying section 912 to
FGROW and this anomalous Hash decision. 17 If we deem the government to
have retained an interest in the FGROW itself, enough to protect its grant
and to allow for railbanking and other public uses, then all is not lost.
Even if the federal government's underlying fee interest has transferred
to homesteaders, that does not mean the scope of the railroad easement is
not sufficient to accommodate interim trail use or to require preservation of
the right-of-way in federal hands for future transportation purposes. Hence,
we should not conclude from the decision in Hash that the railroad's interest
in its right-of-way is a typical, relatively weak, common law easement, or
even an exclusive railroad one. Rather, it remains to be determined if it is a
transportation easement that is subject to shifting public uses and can be
reacquired by the federal government from the railroads without prejudice
to the underlying fee owner remains to be determined. It would seem only
logical that if the federal government gave away public lands to railroads for
transportation and telecommunications purposes, that when the railroads no
longer needed them, the lands would return to government control for other
public uses."' Only if the government determines that the railroad right-of-
way has no foreseeable public use should the federal interest terminate and
the underlying fee be unburdened. 319
317 This holding is clearly dicta, but it has nonetheless been given precedential effect in several
other claims court cases. It squarely conflicts with the view of the court in Beres v. United States,
64 Fed. Cl. 403 (Fed. Cl. 2005), holding the United States did not retain any interest in the
underlying fee. Nonetheless, the court in Beres held the United States did not retain an interest in
1875 Act lands, explicitly stated that its ruling "by no means resolves the case before the court.
There remain numerous issues to resolve before this court can determine if the plaintiffs are
entitled to compensation, including resolution of the successor in title to the land and whether or
not there was an abandonment ... By this decision, we have taken only one step in a series of
steps to determine the property ights and damages clainsatissue. "Id . at 428 (emphasis added).
318 The broad scope of these FGROWs is indicated by 43 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).
319 This is clearly the intent of 43 U.S.C. § 912 when it permits conversion of FGROW to other
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 38 Envtl. L. 765 2008
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
XI. CONCLUSION
Although it may seem a bit excessive to spend this much time criticizing
a single wrongly-decided case, the situation warrants much attention. The
Hash case, if it remains valid, threatens to undermine nearly 200 years of
federal support of transportation infrastructure. It threatens to erode a core
aspect of the National Trails System Act, and it renders inconsequential a
number of federal statutes dealing with FGROW (section 912, section 913,
etc.). Worse, it ignores the public character of FGROW and the public's right
to demand that infrastructure using public lands continue to be devoted to
public purposes. In essence, it construes the railbanking act to be a facial
taldng in all FGROW cases, which is certainly a position the Supreme Court
has rejected. Furthermore, it flaunts the notion of stare decisis which is
crucial to the protection of the very property rights the court purports to be
protecting. This case is not only wrongly decided, but is fundamentally
destructive of the corridor preservation purposes of the railbanking statute.
For these reasons alone it should be overruled.
Fortunately, the Court of Federal Claims recognized the error of this case
and certified an interlocutory appeal on the Hash holding in Elamae Phillips
Co. v. United States,20 which the Federal Circuit has granted.32 1 If the Federal
Circuit does not revise its holding, this case is ripe for Supreme Court review.
The Hash decision creates a rift among the circuits, it misreads Supreme Court
precedents, and it renders numerous federal statutes null and void. When the
dust has settled in this area, we will be able to judge whether the public's
rights to benefit from the lavish right-of-way grants will bear lasting fruit, or
will fall once again to the greed of private landowners.
public uses. See, eg, S. REP. No. 67-388, at 2 (1922).
320 77 Fed. C1. 387 (Fed. C1. 2007).
321 Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, Misc. No. 867, slip op. at 1 2008 WL 586408 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 7, 2008).
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